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Introduction
This dissertation consists of two papers. The first paper “Do Electoral Systems Affect the
Incumbent Probability of Re-election? Evidence from Italian Municipalities” empirically
investigates how electoral systems affect the incumbent likelihood of re-election in Italian
municipalities. It also sheds light on the mechanism through which the electoral system
affects the re-election probability. The overarching goal of the paper is to connect differ-
ent aspects of the issue. I provide new insight into how different electoral systems affect
accountability, politician selection and then economic policies. Results show that the prob-
ability of re-election is significantly higher in majoritarian systems for mayors but not for
assessors and councillors. The majoritarian system defines a clear majority within the city
council and its leader, which increases accountability toward the mayors. Indeed, in the
majoritarian systems, the effort of mayors, measured as the probability of having a social
welfare investment, is higher. Finally, We show that the observed evidence is not driven
by political selection. The second paper “Separated Under the Same Roof: Fiscal Inef-
ficiency of Parties’ Fragmentation and Mayor’s Political Power” investigates the effect of
political fragmentation of local government on fiscal policies. It shows that the effect of
fragmentation on fiscal policies depends mainly on two factors: the presence of a binding
budget constraint and the political power of the executive leader. Results show that, in the
presence of a binding budget constraint, a more fragmented majority performs less public
spending and collects less revenue. Moreover, we show that the negative effect of political
fragmentation disappears while the political power of the mayor increases.
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Chapter 1
Do Electoral Systems Affect the Incumbent Probability of
Re-election? Evidence from Italian Municipalities
1.1 Introduction
Elections nowadays are the most commonly used institution for selecting the political class,
as stressed by Besley (2005). The main aims of electoral rules are to select the best among
the candidates with regard to many possible dimensions, such as ability, competence and
representativeness and to create precise incentive schemes to ensure that politicians, once
elected, operate in the public interest. Scholars have investigated both the impact of electoral
systems on policy outcome and the relationship between a particular incentive mechanism
and the incumbent’s political activity.
This paper studies the causal effect of different electoral systems on the incumbent
likelihood of re-election. It also sheds light on the mechanism trough which the electoral
system affects the incumbent probability of re-election. Is a higher probability of re-election a
consequence of a greater effectiveness of the electoral system in selecting the best candidate?
Or is the creation of better incentive schemes to ensure that the politicians act in the interests
of the community? In other words, this paper tries to connect different aspects of the issue.
The effects of different electoral systems on selection and incentive of politicians, and so on
economic policies, and than the effect of politicians’ activity on future rewards obtained by
the incumbents.
In order to identify the causal effect of the electoral system, this paper exploits a partic-
ular feature of the local Italian electoral systems that were in place before the introduction
of a new regime set in 1993 by the Italian government. Before 1993, cities with less than
5
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5,000 inhabitants were ruled by a plurality system1, instead, cities with more than 5,000
inhabitants were characterized by a party-list proportional system2. After 1993, in cities
with less than 15,000 inhabitants, a plurality system with single ballot and the direct elec-
tion of the mayor has been introduced3. Exploiting the policy change at 5,000 inhabitants
before 1993, the paper identifies the causal effect of the electoral systems on the incum-
bent probability of being re-elected. However, at the threshold of 5,000 inhabitants there
is another policy variation, the wage of the mayor4. For this reason, a standard Regression
Discontinuity Design (RDD) cannot identify the causal effect of the electoral systems. Then,
a Difference-in-Discontinuities Design (Diff-in-Disc), introduced by Grembi, Nannicini, and
Troiano (2012), which combines a Difference-in-Differences strategy and a Regression Dis-
continuities Design, is exploited. Applying a RDD, and then comparing municipalities above
and below the 5,000 inhabitants threshold, the estimated difference would capture the com-
bined effect of a change in the mayor’s wage and a change in electoral system. Since the
confounding factor, the wage of the mayors, remains constant before and after the reform,
while the difference in electoral system disappear after the reform, the Diff-in-Disc strategy
allows to net out the effect of mayor’s wages from the total effect and identify the “true”
effect of the electoral systems. Specifically, this strategy allows to identify the causal effect
of the plurality system, as opposed to the party-list proportional system, on the incumbent
probability of being re-elected. This work also implements a pre/post strategy to provide
evidence on the effect of the introduction of the new regime on municipalities that before the
reform were ruled by two different electoral systems. In other words, this strategy captures,
separately, the difference between a party-list proportional system and the new plurality
system, and between the old and new plurality system.
Data come from a large database that contains the mayoral terms elected from 1985 to
2000 for all 8,092 Italian municipalities. It includes information about the elected mayor,
the members of the executive committee (assessors) and the members of the city council
(councillors). Thanks to the characteristics of the database, the work studies not only the
effects of different electoral systems on the incumbent likelihood of re-election, but also
examines whether the effect is heterogeneous among different heading organs of the local
1In particular a plurality system with panachage, that means the possibility to vote for candidates who
do not belong to the same party. For further details see Section 3 and Table A.2 and A.3.
2It is important to underline that in both cities the same parliamentary form of government was in force.
3Furthermore, a neo-parliamentary form of government is introduced in place of a parliamentary form
of government.
4Mayors of municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants earn about 600 euro less than mayors of cities above
5,000.
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government.
Results show that mayors probability of re-election is about 25 percentage point higher
in majoritarian systems than in proportional system. Instead, there is no evidence that
assessors and councillors have different probability of being re-elected in the two different
electoral systems. Surprisingly, the Difference-in-Discontinuities strategy point out that the
characteristics of the politicians elected under different electoral systems do not show signif-
icant differences, both in terms of age, sex, previous job of the elected and level of education,
that in the literature it is generally used as a measure of the quality of politicians. Moreover,
results show that majoritarian systems are less subject to reshuﬄes of the majority in which
the roles of the politicians within the city council change, including the mayors. Finally, in
majoritarian systems the likelihood of having a social welfare investment is higher, about
20 percentage point, as compared to a proportional systems. Data on public libraries as
a proxy of social welfare investment are used. Building a public library represents a good
approximation of the type of public spending that mayors of small cities undertake to ad-
vertise their conduct. These small municipalities generally do not have sufficient funds to
build or activate a library by themselves, hence the implementation is the result of a long
bargaining process between the municipality and the higher levels of administration, such
as the provinces and the regions5. During the bargaining process the effort of the mayor is
decisive for the success of the project.
The main result of the pre/post analysis shows that the effect of the introduction of the
new regime does not immediately lead the system to a new steady state but it needs time
for the system to reach a new equilibrium point6. In fact, the effect of the introduction of
the new regime is different between the first election and the second election after 1993. In
small cities, where a plurality system was already in force, the effect of the first election
after the reform on the incumbent probability of being re-elected is about 3 percentage point
negative. While at the second election the probability of being re-elected turn to be positive,
about 11 point higher than the first election. Instead, in cities where a proportional system
was in force, surprisingly, the effect of the first election after the reform on the probability
of re-election for mayors is already higher, about 6 percentage point; at the second election
the effect is even higher, about 19 point. This finding points out that during the transition
from a proportional system to a plurality system there is not a selection effect on incumbent
5Also Hessami (2014) in her paper shows that directed elected mayors of German municipalities attract
more investments grants from the state tier during the year of the elections.
6Also Bordignon and Monticini (2012) show how the introduction of a new electoral system for electing
the Italian Parliament does not produce immediately an effect on the party system.
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mayors. Instead, a slight decrease in the probability of re-election is obseved in those cities
where the mayors had already a high probability of being re-elected. The selection effect of
the introduction of the new regime is active only on mayors who were already accountable
for their actions.
This paper relates to several strands of literature. First, scholars have extensively studied
the effect of the electoral system on policy outcome, both theoretically and empirically. It
is well established that the electoral system has a strong impact on both the type and
the size of public spending. In particular, it has been shown that majoritarian systems
promote more targeted public spending and lower levels of corruption (e.g. Lizzeri and
Persico (2001), Persson and Tabellini (2002), Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti, and Rostagno (2002),
Persson, Tabellini, and Trebbi (2003), Persson and Tabellini (2005) and Funk and Gathmann
(2013)). A relevant contribution to this strand of literature is the paper by Gagliarducci,
Nannicini, and Naticchioni (2011) which performs a micro test on the behavior of elected
officials, using a database on Italian House of Representatives. They show that politicians
elected under the majority rule propose targeted programs and have lower absenteeism rates
than politicians elected under the proportional rule. The second strand of the literature
studies the effects of electoral accountability on the policy choices of elected officials. Besley
and Case (1995) argue that politicians planning to run again for office are complied to
act in the interest of voters to deserve re-election and show that the possibility of being
re-elected affects their choices of economic policy. Furthermore, it has been shown that
higher level of accountability increase responsiveness (e.g Besley and Burgess (2002), Hogan
(2008) and, Ferraz and Finan (2011)), and that this affects the probability of re-election
(e.g. Litschig and Morrison (2010), Casaburi and Troiano (2013) and Bracco, Porcelli, and
Redoano (2013)). Finally, other scholars study the effect of electoral system on political
selection (e.g. Myerson (1999), Litschig and Morrison (2010)) and Besley (2005)). The
political representation of certain groups of the population is definitely a function of the
electoral system (e.g. Norris (2004)). Also the quality of elected politicians depends on
the interplay between the personal decision to run for an office and the selection process
made by parties, and both depend on the electoral system (e.g. Caselli and Morelli (2004),
Galasso and Nannicini (2011) and Galasso and Nannicini (2014)).
From a theoretical point of view, it is unclear which is the effect of the electoral system on
the incumbent probability of re-election. On the one hand, a higher level of accountability
is observed in majoritarian systems, which results in a higher level of responsiveness and
then in a higher probability of re-election (e.g. Persson and Tabellini (1999)). On the other
hand, as suggested by Myerson (1993), proportional system lowers barriers to entry and
selects better politicians. Since they are better, they are also more likely to be re-elected.
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The contribution of the paper is threefold. First, it shows that in majoritarian systems
future electoral rewards are concentrated on the figure of the leader of the executive, which
has a substantially higher chance of being re-elected than in proportional systems. Second,
the work provides evidence showing that the higher probability of re-election is not the
result of the selection of a better qualified political class, but the effect is primarily due
to accountability and allocation of responsibilities. Finally, it shows that the introduction
of an important reform of the institutional system does not translate into an immediate
optimal response of agents, but it needs at least two rounds of elections to reach its new
equilibrium point.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the three different local electoral
systems of Italian municipalities in detail. Sections 3 and 4 set up the empirical strategies,
respectively the Difference-in-Discontinuites design and the pre/post strategy. Section 5
describes the data. Section 6 presents the results. Section 7 discusses the empirical results.
Finally, section 8 concludes.
1.2 Institutional Background
Italian municipalities (Comuni) are the third-level administrative divisions of the state.
Each municipality provides many of the basic civil functions: registry of births and deaths,
registry of deeds, contracting for local roads and public works, etc. Furthermore, it is in
charge for the supply of a wide range of services, such as waste management, municipal
police, infrastructures, welfare, housing and water supply.
The Italian municipalities are ruled by a city council (Consiglio Comunale) and an
executive committee (Giunta), headed by a mayor (Sindaco). The electoral systems adopted
to select the municipal government have varied both over time and among municipalities,
depending on the population size of the city. In Table A.1 are reported all the electoral
systems of Italian municipalities relying on the population size and the sample period.
Table A.2 shows the specific characteristics of the four different electoral systems, de-
scribed in detail in the next section. Furthermore, Table A.3 shows the consequences of
voting for the formation of the municipal government in each system. In fact, an elec-
toral system is not only a method for converting votes into seats but it also modifies the
relationship between the various heading organs of local government.
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1.2.1 Electoral Systems
Before the electoral law of 1993, municipalities above 5,000 inhabitants had a party-list pro-
portional system. According to this system, each voter has to choose a party (or civic list),
and can also indicate preferences for the councillors candidate, expressing up to a maximum
of 4 or 5 preferences7. The seats in the city council are proportionally allocated. Then, once
the member of the city council have been elected, they choose the mayor and the member of
the executive committee. The adoption of this system favors a high degree of fragmentation
of the city council, in which even a small party can influence crucial decisions, as in the case
of mayor’s appointment and selection of the members of the executive committee. Assessors
need to be members of the city council.
As pointed out in several works (Baldini and Legnante (2000), Vandelli (1997)), within
this system, the political parties are not mere intermediaries between voters and executive
bodies. Indeed, on the one hand, they are key players in the process of consensus building,
and on the other, once the representatives in the city council were elected, they negotiate
among them the appointment of the executive committee and the mayor. The parties are
the central institution of the government of municipalities. The government activity is
strongly influenced, and in some cases literally paralyzed, by the confusion in the allocation
of responsibilities between various organs, and by the limited decision-making capacity of
the mayors, bounded by the vetoes of the parties8.
In municipalities with a population below 5,000 inhabitants, until 1993, a plurality sys-
tem with limited vote and the possibility to panachage has been in force. Although the
mechanism of voting might seem complicated, its purpose is to maximize the voters oppor-
tunity of selecting the candidates. As well summarized by De Mucci (1990), nominations
must be grouped into lists, distinguished by a mark, including a number of candidates not
exceeding 2/3 of the total number of seats in the city council. Each voter disposes a pack of
votes equal to 4/5 of the seats available in the city council9. Within this limit the voter can:
(1) choose to give their votes to any candidate, regardless of the list to which they belong
(possibility to panachage). (2) assign all preferences at her disposal to a single list, tracing
7According to the population size of the city. Return to Table A.2 for details.
8With respect to this framework, the law no. 142 of 1990 was a first attempt to correct this situation
of permanent paralysis. However, the corrective actions have not worked effectively. As it has been argued
by Baldini and Legnante (2000) and Vandelli (1997) these changes do not alter the mechanism of municipal
representation. It is not affected the role of parties as mediators of consensus and the primary source of
selection, recruitment and legitimacy of the political personnel.
9For example; if the number of councillors in the city council is 15, then every lists could contain a
maximum of 10 candidates and each voter dispose of 12 preferences.
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a sign on the symbol of the list (Voto in testa). In other words, the voter can build her
own customized list or she can choose to allocate their preferences to a single list. Then, all
the candidates who obtained the highest number of preferences (including those obtained
through the voto in testa) are declared elected10. In contrast to the proportional system,
with this specific type of plurality system, the “freedom” of the voter is higher, since she
can express her approval for a large number of candidates. I would make even more clear
that this belong fully to the category of plurality systems. In fact, given the possibles com-
binations of votes, the features and size of this municipalities, this plurality system ensured
almost always a stable majority in the city council. Moreover, the candidate who collect the
highest number of votes is usually elected mayor, but it is not a rule which binding parties
to respect the outcome of the polls11. It is important to emphasize that, within this system,
the decisiveness of electoral competition is always mediated by the parties. In fact, the
electoral system deals only with electing councillors, then the members of the city council
and so parties have to negotiate to form a majority and to elect the mayor12.
On march 25, 1993, after only eight months of legislative procedure, the law no. 81 on
the direct election of the mayor has been approved. As highlighted in other works (Barbera
and Barrera (1993), Agosta (1999)), the law no. 81 is something more than an electoral
reform. It is not a simple review of procedures for converting votes into seats, but it is a
radical change of the outline of representation and municipal government. Indeed, not only
the electoral system changes, but also the parliamentary form of government is replaced by
a neo-parliamentary form of government. Another major change is the population threshold
for the application of the electoral law, which has been brought from 5,000 to 15,000. After
1993, in municipalities under 15,000 inhabitants a single-round plurality system has been
introduced. The electors vote jointly for a list and for the mayor connected to the list,
they can also express a single preference for a councillors candidate. Each mayor may be
connected to a single list. The party and the mayor obtaining the relative majority of
votes, get 2/3 of the seats in the municipal council. The remaining seats are proportionally
distributed to losing parties.
The new law introduces several novelties. It attaches to the mayor the highest degree
10For further information De Mucci (1990) and Riccamboni (1992) undertake a detailed analysis of this
electoral system.
11In his analysis, De Mucci (1990) shows the data related to the frequency with which the candidate with
the most votes were actually elected mayors. In 1985: 79.3% in the North-West, 54.1% in the North-East,
77.7% in the North-Central, 75% in the South-Central, 54% in the South.
12It is important to highlights that the parliamentary form of government of these two groups of cities is
equal. In fact, this feature will allows us to isolate perfectly the causal effect of the electoral system.
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of popular legitimation13. Thus, the mayors emerged as political actors with unexpected
visibility, popularity and influence (Pasotti (2007)). The Reform radically changed the
system of selecting councillors, it ensure a solid majority to the political forces that support
the mayor. It simplifies the political scenario, going in the direction of a bipolar system,
providing stability to the local government.
1.3 Difference-in-Discontinuities Design
This estimation framework identify the causal effect of the plurality system with panachage,
as opposed to the party-list proportional system, the two systems that were in force before
the reform, on the incumbent probability of being re-elected. As already mentioned, the
electoral system that is in force in a municipality depend on its population size. Before
1993 cities with less than 5,000 inhabitant had a plurality system with panachage, cities
with more than 5,000 had a party-list proportional system.
In order to implement this analysis, the sample is restricted to cities between 3,000 and
7,000. This range is chosen for two main reasons: to stay close enough to the threshold
of 5,000 and because, as can be seen from Table A.1, at the threshold of 3,000 inhabitants
other policies change.
It could appear sufficient, exploiting the discontinuity at 5,000 inhabitant before 1993,
implement a cross-sectional Regression Discontinuity design to identify the causal effect of
the majoritarian system. Unfortunately, at 5,000 inhabitants there is another discontinuity,
local politicians above this threshold earn higher wages14. Thus, the standard assump-
tion of continuity of potential outcome of the RD design is violated and a cross-sectional
RD estimator gives biased estimates of the causal effect. However, exploiting the informa-
tion on the period after the reform where both cities have the same plurality system, a
Difference-in-Discontinuities design, introduced by Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2012),
is implemented.
The Difference-in-Discontinuities design (Diff-in-Disc) combines a Difference-in-Differences
strategy and an RD design. The Diff-in-Disc estimator takes the difference between the
cross-sectional discontinuity at the threshold Ps (5,000) before T0 (1993), when both the
13It is important to stress that given the high concentration of power in the hands of the mayors, the
lawmakers enacted a two-term limit for mayors. After the introduction of the reform, any mayor can be in
office only for two consecutive terms. For this reason, only the first two terms after the introduction of the
new reform have been kept in the sample.
14In 2000 a Mayor of a city between 5,000 and 7,000 inhabitants earns 2e,789 gross, one of a city between
3,000 and 5,000 inhabitants earns 2e,169 gross.
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electoral system and the politicians’ wage show a jump, and the cross sectional discontinu-
ity at Ps after T0, when only the politicians’ wage show a jump.
15.
As in Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2012), in order to be able to estimate the causal
effect of the majority system is necessary to derive two precise assumptions, that are in line
with the assumptions needed to implement an RD design and a DIDs strategy.
The effect of the confounding discontinuity on the potential outcome in the case of no
treatment is constant over time.
This assumption is equivalent to the continuity of potential outcome assumption of the
RD design. Furthermore, it has to hold both before and after T0. In other words, this
assumption states that the ratio between the politicians’ wages under 5,000 inhabitants and
the politicians’ wages over 5,000 must be constant throughout all the period of analysis.
Regarding the wage of the politicians it is satisfied since the ratio between the two wages
is constant along all the nineties. For all the others potential outcome, that are observable,
this assumption can be tested.
A second assumption is require to ensure that Difference-in-Discontinuities design esti-
mates the causal effect of the majoritarian system.
The effect of the confounding policy discontinuity is the same in the case of treatment
and no treatment.
This assumption states that a politician, who earns less, and a politician, who earns
more, must react in the same way to the same electoral system. In other words, there must
be no interaction between the treatment and the confounding discontinuity. Assumption 2 in
this scenario seems plausible and it can be presented strong supporting evidence exploiting
other wage thresholds. As can be seen from Table A.1, at the thresholds of 3,000 and 10,000
inhabitants, the wage of the mayor changes but not the electoral system16. Exploiting this
feature, the same Diff-in-Disc model that is carried out at the threshold of 5,000 is performed
of 3,000 and 10,000 inhabitants. These estimates identify the interaction between the income
of the mayor and the introduction of the new electoral law on the probability of being re-
elected17.
15see Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2012)
16This “test” is even more useful considering that around the threshold of 3,000 inhabitants the change
of wages is comparable to that existing at the threshold of 5,000. The difference in wage is 723 euro at the
threshold of 3,000 inhabitants, 620 euro at 5,000 and 310 at 10,000 inhabitants.
17Differently from the setting of the paper by Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2012), in this framework
assumption 2 is conditio sine qua non to be able to identify the causal effect of the electoral systems.
Because the introduction of the new electoral system takes place simultaneously for both groups of cities.
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Let Yc be a dummy variable that take value 1 if the politician is re-elected 0 otherwise
18,
P ∗c is the normalized population size P
∗
c = Pc − Ps. Then, Sc is a dummy for city below
5,000 and Tt takes value 1 in the years before the reform, until 1992, 0 otherwise.
Thus, the sample is restricted to the interval Pc ∈ [Ps − h, Ps + h] and a local linear
probability model of this form is estimated:
Yct = δ0 + δ1P
∗
c + Sc(γ0 + γ1P
∗
c ) + Tt[α0 + α1P
∗
c + Sc(β0 + β1P
∗
c )] + ct (1.1)
Standard error are clustered at the city level. The coefficient of interest is β0 and it identifies
the causal effect of the majoritarian system, as the treatment is Sc × Tt. In word, being a
town with less than 5,000 inhabitants before 1993 (excluded).
In addition, as it is discussed later in the paper, since the database contains two electoral
terms after the reform, it can be controlled for heterogeneous effect of the introduction of
the new regime. Thus the following model is estimated:
Yct = δ0 + δ1P
∗
c +Sc(γ0 + γ1P
∗
c )+
Tt[α0 + α1P
∗
c + Sc(β0 + β1P
∗
c )]+Ft[pi0 + pi1P
∗
c + Sc(λ0 + λ1P
∗
c )] + ct
(1.2)
where Ft is a dummy variable that take values 1 for all the first election after the reform
and 0 otherwise. Also here, the coefficient of interest is β0, which now, identifies the causal
effect of the majoritarian system, controlling for the the long-term effects of the reform.
Finally, as it is suggested by literature, a spline polynomial approximation, allowing for
a flexible functional form in the relationship between Yct and Pc, is performed:
Yct =
p∑
k=0
(δkP
∗k
c ) + Sc
p∑
k=0
(γkP
∗k
c ) + Tt[
p∑
k=0
(αkP
∗k
c ) + Sc
p∑
k=0
(βkS
∗k
c )] + ξct (1.3)
Then, also in the case, controlling for a possible heterogeneous effect of the reform, the
18Before the introduction of the new form of government in 1993, municipalities were ruled by a parlia-
mentary form of government; therefore, more than one mayor could be in office during the same legislature
term. For the purposes of the analysis, and for all the paper, it is used only the last mayor before the end
of the term.
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following model is estimated:
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(1.4)
In both cases standard error are clustered at the city level, and as it is recommended by
literature the same model with different degrees of polynomials is estimated19.
1.4 Pre/Post Strategy
In this framework the dataset is split into two subsamples, cities below 5,000 inhabitants
(from now on small cities), cities between 5,000 and 15,000 inhabitants (medium cities).
This estimation framework exploits a pre-post approach to identify the effect of the reform on
the incumbent probability of being re-elected, in the two different group of cities. Applying
this strategy it can be estimated the effect of the transition from a plurality system with
panachage, for small cities, and from a party-list proportional system, for medium cities, to
a plurality system with single-round.
Thus, for city c in year t, a linear probability model of this form is estimated:
Yct = β1Rct + δXct + αc + uct (1.5)
where Yct denotes a dummy that is 1 if the mayor (assessor or councillor) is re-elected 0
otherwise. Rct is a binary indicator equal to 1 in the year of the first election under the new
reform and all the year thereafter. The specification includes also citiy fixed effects (αc) and
a number of time-varying variables Xct on the mayor (assessor, councillor) characteristics.
Standard error are clustered at the city level.
The parameter of interest is β1, which identifies the average effect of the introduction
of the new regime. Also in this framework it is performed a specification that allows for
heterogeneous effect of the reform. Thus, comparing the effect between the last election with
the old system and the first election with the new regime, and between the first election
19As recommended by Lee and Lemieux (2010).
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and the second election with the new electoral system.
Yct = β2Rct + β3SEct + δXct + αc + uct (1.6)
where Rct is the same variable as before and SEct is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for
all the second election after the reform and 0 otherwise. Also in this case standard error are
clustered at the city level. In this model, β2 identifies the effects of the first election after
the reform with respect to the old electoral system, β3 identifies the effects of the second
election with the new system, as opposed to the first election. Finally, β2 + β3 identifies the
long term effects of the reform.
1.5 Data
The original dataset contains the mayoral terms elected from 1985 to 2000 for more than
8,000 Italian municipalities20. It includes information about gender, age, education, political
affiliation and previous job of the elected mayor, of the members of the executive committee
(assessors) and of the members of the city council (councillors)21.
Table A.4 reports some descriptive statistics about the main variables, by group, for the
sample of the cities used for the diff-in-disc analysis, as discussed in the previous sections.
While in Table A.5 are reported the statistics of the same variables for the large sample
of cities used for the pre/post analysis. The first (second) sample contain information on
1,471 (5,873) municipalities with about 3 (3) terms for each city, 488 (1,222) medium cities
and 983 (4,651) small cities 22.
The population size comes from the 1991 Census. Note that one of the identifying
assumptions for the Difference-in-Discontinuities design is that the local government had
(at most) imprecise control over the number of local resident. Given that the population
size used to assign the electoral system is based on to the latest census available, then every
ten years, it is unlikely that a politicians can manipulate the population of their city.
Table A.4 shows that the percentage of mayors re-elected is higher in small cites, about
12 percentage point more than medium, considering the whole period. Furthermore, it is
20Data are available on the website of the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs.
21Due to the high amount of errors and the lack of the specific name for the party, political affiliation is
not used in the present work.
22Municipalities in region with special autonomy have been dropped because both before and after the
reform they are ruled by different electoral systems
1.6. Results 17
interesting to note that observing only the period pre-reform, this difference is even more
pronounced. The percentage of mayors re-elected in small cities is 21 point higher than
medium cities. However, this differences is greatly reduced in the post-reform period. On
the other hand, this gap observed among the two sample of cities on the percentage of mayors
re-elected almost disappears in the case of the percentage of councillors and assessors re-
elected.
Figures A.7(a) and A.7(b) show the distribution of elections by year, respectively for
small and medium municipalities. Although there are municipalities that go for election
every year, elections are concentrated in the years 1990, 1995 and 1999. This concentration
is more pronounced for small municipalities. This happens because small municipalities are
more stable than medium cities, then the probability of early dissolution of the office is
lower in small municipalities, as it will be shown in the next sections of the paper.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 The Effect of the Electoral System
Table A.6 presents the main results of the Diff-in-Disc strategy, the effect of the majoritarian
system on the incumbent probability of re-election. Panel A reports the results for mayors,
while panel B and C, present the results for councillors and assessors, respectively. Columns
(1) and (2) present the estimates of a local linear regression model, according to equation
(1). The optimal bandwidth h is estimated either following Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012) (Column 1), or implementing the algorithm presented by Calonico, Cattaneo, and
Titiunik (013a,b) (Column 2). Columns (3) and (4) show the results for a spline polynomial
approximation as in equation (3), and two different orders of the polynomial are presented
(i.e., 2nd and 3rd)23. All the subsequent tables present results following the scheme described
above.
In majoritarian systems the mayors’ probability of re-election is higher than in propor-
tional systems and the point estimate ranges from 12.13 percentage point (when h = 1, 992)
23In order to show that results are not affected by different specifications or samples size, as recommended
by Lee and Lemieux (2010), the graphs of Fig A.9 are presented. The graphs present the results of nearly
two thousand Diff-in-Disc estimations with different bandwidth. In the vertical axis, the coefficients (center
line), and confidence intervals (lateral lines), are reported. In the horizontal axis, at 0, the bandwidth
used is h = 2, 000 and at 1990, h = 10. As prescribed by the literature, in linear models (top graphs) the
bandwidth choice has no effect on the significance of the coefficients, except for estimates really near to the
threshold. In non-linear models (bottom graphs) the significance decreases as h approaches to 1,000 for the
second degree, and as h approaches to 1,500 with the third degree of the polynomial.
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to 18.87 percentage point (when h = 693). The coefficient is statistically significant even
when a spline polynomial approximation of the third degree is estimated. As panel B and C
of table A.6 show, the effect of the majoritarian system on the probability of re-election for
councillors and assessors, even if always positive, is never statistically different from zero.
It is also observed that the magnitude of the coefficients is small.
Table A.7 reports the results of the Diff-in-Disc strategy controlling for the heterogeneous
effect between the first and the second election after the introduction of the new regime,
according to equation (2) and (4)24. Even these estimates support the evidence shown above:
the effect of the majoritarian system is positive and statistically significant for mayors,
but never statistically different from zero for councillors and assessors. Finally, in Table
A.8 the estimates of equation (2) and (4) for the mayors’ probability of re-election are
reported, including either year and city fixed effect (panel A), or time invariant geographical
characteristics as control (panel B)25. The results are also robust to these further controls.
The top graphs of the figures A.1, A.2 and A.3 illustrate a polynomial fit of the difference
between the probability of re-election after and before the reform, for mayors, assessors
and councilors respectively. The central graphs illustrate, separately, the probability of re-
election before the reform (left) and the probability of re-election after the reform (right)26.
These descriptive graphs are perfectly consistent with the results shown above. Indeed, in
the top graphs of Figure A.1 the probability of re-election for mayors exhibits a sharp jump
when moving from the left to the right of the threshold. Even looking at the graph that
illustrates the period before the reform, when the electoral law changes, a jump is observed
at the threshold. Instead, a discontinuity is not observed in the period after the reform, when
both groups of city are ruled by the same system. Considering assessors and councillors, in
none of the graphs presented in Figure A.2 and A.3 a discontinuity is observed.
Table A.9 presents the results for the probability of having a library27. This variable
is a dummy that takes value 1 if during the office a public library in the city is built28.
24As will be shown later in the paper this specification is the most appropriate, given that the introduction
of the reform does not have an homogeneous effect between the first and second election after the introduction
of the reform.
25The following variables are included; Area Size, Capital Altitude, River, Sea Distance, Seismicity Class,
Urbanization, Average Grid, Region Fixed Effect.
26In the two bottom graphs the probability of re-election after the reform is split in the two period, the
first election after the reform (left) and the second election after the reform (right).
27Data on libraries come from the webpage of the Register of Italian Libraries:
http://anagrafe.iccu.sbn.it/opencms/opencms/.
28In order to have results comparable with those presented above, it is used the same sample that was
used for the analysis of Mayors. Also using the whole sample that start from 1970 the results are unchanged.
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In majoritarian system, the probability of having a library is higher than in proportional
system. The point estimate ranges from 16.23 percentage point (h = 826) to 23.07 point
(h = 465). The results are also robust when it is controlled for the heterogeneous effect of
the reform (panel B). In this case, an additional check is performed. Given that the size
of the city for the construction of a library is an important factor, the sample is restricted
to cities between 4,000 and 6,000 inhabitants and the optimal bandwidth h is estimated
again. The results are also robust to this additional control. The graphs in Figure A.4
confirm what has been just shown, the probability of having a library increases significantly
in municipalities with less than 5,000 inhabitants before the reform, while no jumps are
observed at the threshold after the introduction of the new regime. Although building a
public library in so small municipalities does not represent the sole effort of the mayors of
the cities, certainly the mayors have an important role.
Italian municipalities before 1993 were ruled by a parliamentary form of government,
then it is possible that during a term within the same elected council there has been more
then one government. As already pointed out and stressed by political scientists, changes
of the majority and the executive commette members occur often, especially in cities ruled
by a proportional system. The variable reshuﬄing is the fraction of politicians who have
held more than a role (e.g. councilor and assessor or assessor and mayor) over the total
number of members who have held at least one seat during the same term of the city
council. In panel A of Table A.10 the variable reshuﬄing is dichotomized into a dummy
taking value 1 for reshuﬄing involving more than one-third of the council members, zero
otherwise. This panel shows that the effect of the majoritarian system on the probability of
having a fraction of reshuﬄing higher than the one-third is positive but never statistically
different from zero. Instead, looking at panel B of Table A.10 it can be seen that, in a
majoritarian system there is a lower probability of having a fraction of reshuﬄing lower
than the 40%. The coefficients are negative and statistically significant in all cases. The
result is also confirmed looking at the probability of a reshuﬄing higher than the 50% and
the probability of a reshuﬄing higher than the 60% of all the members of the city council.
The graphs in Figure A.5 also confirm the results just shown. This finding confirms evidence
shown by political scientists, according to whom low levels of reshuﬄing are present also in
majoritarian systems. Tensions within the majority about some issues can arise also within
the majoritarian system and then in some cases it is necessary to reorganize the majority.
In contrast, proportional systems are subject to really high levels of reshuﬄing, with some
extreme cases where about all of the members of city council have held at least two roles.
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1.6.2 The Effect of the Introduction of the New Regime
Panel A of Table A.15 reports the pre-post estimates for small cities, that is the effect of the
introduction of the new regime in cities ruled by a plurality system with panachage. Column
(1) of panel A shows that the probability of re-election for mayors is 4.38 percentage point
higher after the reform. However, controlling for the heterogeneous effect of the reform, as
in equation 1.6, it is observed (Column 2) that the effect of the reform is negative in the first
election after the reform, by about 4 percentage point, and positive in the second election
after the reform, about 10 point higher. The result are robust controlling either for mayors
specific characteristics or for citiy fixed effects.
Panel B of Table A.15 shows the results for medium cities, that is the effect of the
introduction of the new regime in cities ruled by a party-list proportional system. The
average effect of the reform for mayors is higher then in small cities, 16.37 percentage point.
In contrast to small towns an increase is already observed in the first election after the
reform, about 7 percentage point (Column 4), and a further increase in the second election,
about 19 point. This finding point out that a screening effect on incumbent mayors is not
observed during the transition from a proportional system to a plurality system. Instead,
a slight decrease in the probability of being re-elected is observed in those cities where
the mayors had already a high probability of being re-elected. The screening effect of the
introduction of the new regime is active only on mayors that were already accountable, even
if the magnitude of the effect is small.
1.6.3 Validity test
As already discussed, the estimation of the causal effect of the electoral system by the Diff-
in-Disc strategy relies on some Assumptions. This section is devoted to provide evidence in
support of these assumptions.
The first assumption is that mayors have (at most) imprecise control over the number of
local residents. If mayors can manipulate the population size of their cities estimates would
suffer from selection bias. It is unlikely that a mayor can manipulate the size of their cities
by forcing resident to leave the city to change the electoral system and at the cost of a lower
wage. Moreover, the population size used to assign the electoral system is based on the
latest census available (census are made every ten years)29. Nevertheless, a continuity test
for the density of the population size at 5,000 is performed. The result shows the absence
29The Census is run independently by the National Statistical Office
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of manipulation, there is no discontinuity of the density at the threshold30.
Tables A.12, A.13 and A.14 report the estimates of the Diff-in-Disc strategy, that is
the causal effect of the electoral system, by using as dependent variables some time-varying
politicians’ characteristics. The results show that, at the threshold, the mayors elected ac-
cording to a plurality system are no different in terms of age, years of education, probability
of being a male and previous job with respect to mayors elected according to a party-list
proportional system. In addition, the average schooling of the city council members and the
average schooling of the cabinet of the mayors do not show a jump at the threshold. Fig
A.7 graphically presents results shown in the Tables A.12, A.13 and A.14. Panel A and B
of Table A.14 show that majoritarian systems are more stable than proportional systems31.
Indeed, the probability of early dissolution of the office is lower in majoritarian system, and
the average length of the legislature is longer than proportional system.
Tab A.17 reports the results of the balance tests of time-invariant characteristics of
municipalities which belong to the sample. A Diff-in-Disc estimation is implemented using
as dependent time-invariant characteristics, in order to assess whether the fraction of cities
with certain fixed characteristics varies at the threshold. Time-invariant characteristics do
not display a statistically significant jump at the threshold.
Table A.16 illustrates the results of a falsification test on the introduction of the new
regime. First, years before the introduction of the new regime are dropped (before 1993).
Then, the causal effect of being a cities with less than 5,000 inhabitant between 1993 and
1997 is identified32. As it is observed in Table A.16 for all the outcome variables the false
majoritarian system is not statistically different from zero. In addition, although the tables
are not reported, cross-sectional regression discontinuity estimates are performed separately,
for the pre-reform period, for the first election after the reform and for the second election
after the reform. Only before the introduction of the new regime a positive and statistically
significant effect is observed.
In order to further test Assumption 2, Diff-in-Disc estimates at the threshold of 3,000
and 10,000 are performed. As it is observed in Table A.1 at the threshold of 3,000 and 10,000
the wage of the mayors changes but not the electoral system. These estimates identify the
interaction between the income of the mayor and the introduction of the new electoral law
30The graphs of these tests are not reported for a matter of space. Several papers have already tested
this assumption in the same framework, among others Grembi, Nannicini, and Troiano (2012).
31Although the result is not robust.
32Using either 1996 or 1998 as the false year of the introduction of the new regime does not change the
qualitative results of the test
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on the probability of being re-elected. Table A.17 illustrates the results of these tests for the
mayors’ probability of re-election and for the probability of having a library. In almost all
cases the income of the mayor does not interact with the introduction of the new electoral
regime.
Finally, a set of tests in the spirit of DellaVigna and La Ferrara (2010) are performed. A
set of Diff-in-Disc estimates at false population threshold below and above 5,000 are carried
out (at any point from 4,000 to 4,990 and any point from 5,010 to 5,600). Although the test
is severe, Fig A.8 shows that for the re-election probability of the mayor and the probability
of having a library there is no evidence of systematic effect similar to our baseline (vertical
red line).
1.7 Discussion
The first important implication of the evidence shown so far is that politicians elected un-
der a majoritarian system do not differ from politicians elected by a proportional system in
term of several characteristics. This suggests that majoritarian systems do not select better
qualified politicians than proportional system33. Another important piece of evidence to
support this conclusion is the analysis of the effect of the introduction of the new regime.
If the majoritarian system was more able to select most qualified politicians it should be
observed a sharp drop in the probability of being re-elected in the transition from a propor-
tional system to a majoritarian system. Instead, it is observed exactly the opposite schema.
In addition, it is interesting to note that the screening effect of the introduction of the new
regime is observed only in municipalities where a plurality system was already in force.
Only mayors who are already at the center of the political scene can be punished. Instead,
mayors who do not have many opportunities to undertake decisions about policy outcome
can not be punished.
Table A.11 report Diff-in-Disc estimates, where the sample of the mayors is split ac-
cording some fixed characteristics of the town, in order to observe if the causal effect of the
majoritarian system is heterogeneous according this characteristics. In Panel A of Table
A.11 the sample is split according to the share of votes that the first party took in the city
at the general election of 1992. This is a good approximation of the degree of fragmentation
of the political framework and therefore of the number of parties that form the majority
of the mayors. Panel A of Table A.11 shows that among cities where the first party took
33Although for a complete analysis the candidate pool should be to observed.
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more than 34 percentage point of votes (the median of the sample), the effect of the majori-
tarian system is positive and statistically significant, while among cities below the median
the effect is never statistically different from zero34. In addition, among cities above the
median the magnitude of the effect is higher than the baseline estimate, between 30 and
50 percentage point. Moreover, in Panel B Table A.11 the sample is split according to the
number of daily newspaper that circulate at province level. Evidence shows that the effect
of the majoritarian system is significantly differ from zero only when there is a higher daily
newspaper circulation.
These additional findings, together with those already presented, complete the picture
and give a clear view of the issue under discussion. In majoritarian systems there is a
higher probability of being re-elected because the mayors have more visibility and they can
better signal their activities to the community. When policy outcomes are the result of a long
bargaining process among a high number of players (party secretaries, councillors, assessors,
mayors, etc.), and the mayor is just one of the actors of the decision-making process, his
chance of being re-elected is much lower. When the mayor enjoys a stable homogeneous
majority and there are lower level of reshuﬄing, he has a higher decision-making power and
the allocation of responsibility is concentrated in his hands, he has a high probability of
being re-elected.
1.8 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the effect of majoritarian systems, as opposed to proportional systems,
on the incumbent probability of being re-elected. Exploiting a particular feature of the local
Italian electoral systems that were in place before the introduction of a new regime in 1993
the work identifies the causal effect of the electoral systems.
Evidences show that in a majoritarian system mayors have a higher probability of being
re-elected than in proportional system, about 25 percentage point. In contrast, the majori-
tarian system has no effect on the incumbent probability of re-election for councillors and
assessors.
The paper shows that the higher probability of re-election for mayors is mainly due to
a concentration of accountability in the hands of the mayors. On the contrary, there is no
evidence that the majoritarian systems select better qualified politicians. Unfortunately,
34Wald tests are presented to test if the coefficients of the two sample are statistically different from each
other.
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this paper is not able to determine whether this allocation of responsibility wold actually
translate into a better administration of public affairs or if instead this is only a high
concentration of power.
Chapter 2
Separated Under the Same Roof: Fiscal Inefficiency of Parties’
Fragmentation and Mayor’s Political Power1
2.1 Introduction
The increase in public debts in advanced economies in the last 40 years raises the question
of whether a large number of decision makers, with different preferences, is able to contain
public spending. The common pool resource problem, investigated by Weingast et al. (1981)
and Shepsle and Weingast (1981), suggests that enlarging the number of actors involved in
the fiscal decision making process leads to larger total spending. These dynamics rely on
having a specific misaligned incentive between the contribution that a group makes to the
pool, and the benefit that it can extract. Indeed, if the benefit is group specific and the
contribution is uniform across groups, every group has an incentive to free ride and total
spending increases. But if the benefit is common across groups, and the contribution is
group specific, each group will tend to underprovide to the pool, which results in the classic
underprovision of public good. So it is not ex ante clear, theoretically and empirically, how
a larger fragmentation of the political decision making process affects total spending.
This paper investigates the effect of an increase of the political fractionalization of a
majority coalition on fiscal outcomes, such as spending and revenues. We analyse a model
of fiscal decision making by a ruling coalition in a municipal council. The ruling coalition
is made of parties, each of which represents a single group of citizens in the municipality.
Each group values only one public good, among the ones provided by the local government.
Each party chooses the level of taxation for the group she represents. The resources are
pooled together and subject to a bargaining among parties that determines the share that
1This chapter is joint Matteo Cervellati and Paolo Roberti (University of Bologna).
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accrues to each group specific public good. Each party also selects how much of the public
good valued by its group to be financed through public debt. Total debt is repaid at
a future date equally by each group. We find that the level of debt increases with the
number of parties in the ruling coalition of the municipal council, because the benefit of an
increase in debt is completely internalized, while the cost is shared by all parties. The sum
of group specific taxations decreases with the fragmentation of the majority, because the
contribution of each group is then pooled in the bargaining and split in the group specific
public goods, thus the benefit of an increase in contribution decreases with the number of
actors involved in the bargaining, while the cost is completely internalized by each party.
If fiscal rules impose a tight budget constraint, the fragmentation of parties reduces total
public spending, via a reduction of total contribution. We then analyze how the political
power of the mayor interacts with fragmentation in determining fiscal policies. The mayor
maximizes the welfare of the voters who elected her. In order to achieve the best outcome
for voters, she can promise that the contribution of each group will be spent directly in the
public good valued by that group. If she is politically strong enough to keep her promise,
she solves the problem of underprovision to the pool induced by fragmentation, because
each party internalizes both the benefit and the cost of contribution. If she is politically
too weak to impose her will to the coalition, the bargaining takes place. Parties anticipate
this outcome and underprovide to the pool. In this case, the inefficiency induced by the
fragmentation of parties is kept.
We test the implications of this model, focusing on all Italian municipalities with more
than 15.000 inhabitants, in the period between 2002 and 2012. In municipalities with a
population exceeding 15.000 inhabitants a majority system with runoff is in force. Each
candidate for mayor can be connected to more than one party. The voter can cast at most
two votes in a ballot, one for the mayor and one for a party. The candidate who gets most
votes is elected mayor, if the share of votes exceeds 50%, or the first two candidates get to the
runoff. The coalition of parties associated with the mayor gets 60% of the available seats
in the city council that are distributed proportionally to the parties inside the alliance,
according to their share of votes. Depending on the distribution of votes across parties
within coalition, the budget allocation can involve a large number of actors. When choosing
the budget allocation, each municipality faces an extremely tight fiscal rule imposed by law,
that makes the creation of deficit an unfeasible option.
One particular feature of the Italian electoral law for municipalities is exploited to iden-
tify the causal effect of political fractionalization on fiscal outcomes. The position in the
ballot of the parties of the same coalition is randomized by state officials. We use this
characteristic to instrument the fractionalization of the winning majority. In particular, we
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take advantage of a peculiar disposition of names and symbols in the ballot which creates a
focal point for voters. We verify that the party which is positioned close to the name of the
candidate for mayor receives on average 4% share of votes more within coalition. Moreover,
the probability of obtaining at least one seat in the city council is on average 10 percentage
point higher. If a small party ends up in the focal point, she receives a boost of votes and
seats, at the expenses of the other parties of the coalition. Thus fractionalization increases.
The opposite happens when a large party is randomly located in the focal point. Thus, the
ballot order provides an exogenous variation of fractionalization, which conveniently coded
can be used as an instrument.
The first finding is that an increase in fractionalization in the winning coalition causes a
reduction in total expenditure, both capital and current. The effect is sizable: an increment
of 10% in the fractionalization index at mean value implies a reduction of 5.7% in total
expenditure. Morever, a larger fractionalization does not only reduce spending, but it is
also matched with a decrease in total revenues. This effect is driven by a reduction in fees
and tariffs, that target specific groups in the population.
Secondly, we proxy the political power of the mayor by the share of votes she received
in the first round. In particular, if the mayor in the first round got less than 50% of
the votes she is denoted as politically weak. Otherwise she is strong. We show that the
reduction of spending and revenues implied by a larger fractionalization is concentrated on
weak mayors. For politically strong mayors, a larger fragmentation of the majority does
not decrease significantly either spending or revenues. These results are confirmed when a
regression discontinuity design is performed on the threshold of 50 % of votes obtained by
the mayor. This test is particularly demanding because there is no difference in terms of
allocation of seats among the mayors who took slightly more than 50% of the votes and
mayors who took slightly less than the majority of votes. Both of them have 60% of the seats
in the council. The weak mayors only had to face two more weeks of electoral campaign.
We also verify that that there are no new alliances formed between the first election and
the runoff.
These two results are in line with the predictions of the model. In particular, they
suggest that a fragmented majority, that cannot finance spending through deficit, could be
affected by a systematic underspending. Moreover, the political power of the mayor, despite
being in our empirical setting independent from the the size of the majority in the municipal
council, is shown to be a strong determinant of fiscal policies.
The research on this topic, always performed at a country level, see for example Perotti
and Kontopoulos (2002) Volkerink and De Haan (2001) and Ricciuti (2004), has usually
found a positive correlation between the fragmentation of the decision making process, ex-
28 Chapter 2. Separated Under the Same Roof
pressed either as the number of parties in the majority or the number of spending ministers,
and public expenditure, providing support for the common pool resource problem. This
increase was paired with an expansion of public deficit.
The setting of this empirical exercise is different from previous works for a number of
reasons. Former research on fractionalization and public spending has been conducted on a
country level, where political institutions, different electoral laws and forms of government
can be a strong confounding factor. Furthermore, the presence of other omitted variables is
likely to invalidate the causal interpretation of country studies on this topic. Finally, most
of these studies analysed countries in a period of time in which they faced a slack budget
constraint, because the stock of government debt was relatively low. In this work not only
the institutional environment is common to all units of observation, but also all mayors have
a stable majority. Moreover Italian municipalities in this window of years faced a balanced
budget constraint imposed by law which forced them to rely on their own resources to
finance public spending. This limitation is the same that many national governments face
nowadays, with either debt ceiling laws as in the US, or convergence criteria, as in the
European Union.
2.2 The Model
This section outlines a stylized model, where parties independently choose a level of taxation
for the group of citizens they represent, and a level of debt. While debt is repaid at a future
date, the taxes are pooled together and are subject to a bargaining, which determines the
share of resources, which added to the level of debt chosen by each party, are devoted
to each group specific public good. Increasing the fragmentation of parties reduces total
contribution, because each party completely internalizes the cost of contribution, but only
a fraction of the benefit, the rest of which is shared among the other groups. Fragmentation
increases total debt, because the benefit is completely internalized by each party, and the cost
is shared among all groups. If fiscal rules impose a tight budget constraint, the fragmentation
of parties reduces total public spending, via a reduction of total contribution.
A welfare-maximizing mayor can promise to link directly the contribution of each party
to the group specific public good. If she is politically strong enough to keep her promise,
she solves the problem of underprovision to the pool induced by fragmentation, because
each party internalizes both the benefit and the cost of contribution. If she is politically
too weak to impose her will, the bargaining takes place. Parties anticipate this outcome
and underprovide to the pool. In this case, the inefficiency induced by the fragmentation of
parties is kept.
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2.2.1 Parties
Let us consider a game where N parties form the political coalition that supports the mayor
of a municipality. The aggregated wealth of the groups of citizens represented in the ruling
coalition is denoted by w. Each party i ∈ S = {1, ..., N} represents a group of citizens
holding a fraction 1
N
of wealth w. An individual of group i has utility u1(ci) by private
consumption ci, and has utility u2(gi) by the consumption of a group specific public good
gi. Each individual perceives the burden of debt b for the next generation as a cost, shared
among the individuals of all groups: 1
k
c( b
N
), where k ∈]0,∞[.
2.2.2 The determination of fiscal policies
Party i chooses how much of the wealth of group i to dedicate to a group specific taxation
ti and to private consumption. There is a bargaining among the parties about the share
of the total taxation T :=
∑N
j=1 tj that finances public goods g1,...,gN . Party i selects also
debt bi to finance public good gi. Total debt is b :=
∑N
i=1 bi.
The problem party i faces can be represented as follows:
max
ti,ci,bi
u1(ci) + u2 (gi(T, bi))− 1
k
c
(
b
N
)
, (2.1)
such that cj + tj = 1Nw, j ∈ S,gj = fj(T ) + bj, j ∈ S. (2.2)
The vector (f1(T ), ..., fN(T )) is the result of the bargaining among the parties, where∑N
j=1 fj(T ) = T . Let us assume that the bargaining delivers the following partition: fj(T ) =
1
N
T , so that the revenues accruing from the group specific taxation are shared equally.
Let us find the Nash equilibrium in pure strategies of this game for the case in which
u1(·) = u2(·) = log(·), c(·) = 12(·)2. Problem (2.1) becomes
max
ti≥0,bi≥0
log
(
1
N
w − ti
)
+ log
(
1
N
T + bi
)
− 1
2k
(
b
N
)2
. (2.3)
The first order conditions for party i are the following:
1
N
(
1
N
T + bi
)−1
−
(
1
N
w − ti
)−1
= 0. (2.4)
(
1
N
T + bi
)−1
− 1
N
b
kN
= 0. (2.5)
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In equation (2.4) party i internalizes fully the cost
(
1
N
w − ti
)−1
of an increase in ti, but
only a fraction 1/N of the benefit
(
1
N
T + bi
)−1
. The opposite is true in equation (2.5) for
an increase in debt bi: party i internalizes fully the benefit
(
1
N
T + bi
)−1
, but only a fraction
1/N of the cost b
kN
. Aggregating equation (2.4) for all i ∈ S we derive the following relation
between total taxation T and total debt b: T = max{w−Nb
N+1
, 0}. Substituting T = w−Nb
N+1
in
equation (2.5) and aggregating it for all i ∈ S we obtain the following expression for total
debt:
b =
−w +√w2 + 4kN3(N + 1)
2
. (2.6)
The public spending of this municipality, represented by the sum of all group specific public
goods
∑N
j=1 gi = T + b is the following:
T + b =
w +
√
w2 + 4kN3(N + 1)
2(N + 1)
. (2.7)
Notice that T could have a corner solution and be equal to 0, if w −Nb < 0, which is true
if N and/or k are sufficiently high. If the fragmentation of parties is high and/or the cost
of debt is low the municipality does not resort to groups’ taxation and finances spending
only through debt. [comparative statics] The debt b increases with N and k. The sum
of group specific transfers T decreases with N and k. The public spending T + b of the
municipality increases with N if k is above a threshold k¯ > 0, it decreases with N if k is
below k¯. The public spending increases with k. Hence, if the cost of debt is sufficiently
low, the parties of the ruling coalition face a common pool resource problem, adding a
party to the coalition will increase the level of spending because that party will ask for an
additional public good, the cost of which will be only partially internalized. If instead the
cost of debt is high, the parties of the coalition face a problem of underprovision of taxation.
Parties have to finance spending through taxes on local groups, because they cannot resort
anymore to debt. But they cannot control how their contribution will be spent, because all
contributions are pooled together. Thus, an additional party will reduce the willingness of
groups to donate to the pool, because that party will receive a part of their contribution.
In the case we are considering, municipalities face tight fiscal rules, that impose them to
avoid the creation of debt, therefore we expect them to face a problem of underprovision of
group specific taxation.
Now, let us consider case in which the municipality cannot issue debt. Notice that the
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problem faced by a coalition welfare maximizer, in this situation, is the following:
max
t1,...,tN
N∑
j=1
u1
(
1
N
w − tj
)
+Nu2
(
1
N
T
)
. (2.8)
If u1(·) = u2(·) = log(·), c(·) = 12(·)2, the first order condition for contribution ti is:(
1
N
T
)−1
−
(
1
N
w − ti
)−1
= 0 (2.9)
The coalition welfare maximizer fully internalizes the benefit and the cost of in increase in
ti, because she considers also the effect of ti on the public goods accruing to the other N −1
groups. Aggregating equation (2.9) for all i ∈ S we obtain the following expression for the
welfare maximizing revenues: TW = w/2.
Let us assume that a mayor, whose objective is to maximize the total welfare of the
voters who elected her, can partially commit with party i to devote the contribution ti
to public good gi. With probability p the mayor is able to keep this promise, with the
complementary probability there is a bargaining that determines the share of revenues T
that is devoted to finance the group specific public good gi. We interpret p as the political
power of the mayor. A politically powerful mayor is able to impose her will to the ruling
coalition. Let us assume that the share fi determined by the bargaining is equal to 1/N .
The problem party i faces can be represented as follows:
max
ti
p
[
u1
(
1
N
w − ti
)
+ u2 (ti)
]
+ (1− p)
[
u1
(
1
N
w − ti
)
+ u2
(
1
N
T
)]
. (2.10)
Let us assume that u1(·) = u2(·) = log(·), c(·) = 12(·)2. The first order condition for group
i ∈ S is the following:
p (ti)
−1 + (1− p) 1
N
(
1
N
T
)−1
−
(
1
N
w − ti
)−1
= 0. (2.11)
If the mayor successfully commits, group i internalizes the whole benefit of an increase
in ti, while if the mayor fails to commit, group i internalizes only a fraction
1
N
of the
benefit. Aggregating equation (2.11) for all i ∈ S we obtain the following expression for the
equilibrium revenues T :
T =
1− p+Np
N + 1− p+Npw. (2.12)
[The political power of the mayor] Revenues and public spending increase with the
probability p of commitment by the mayor. In particular, if p = 1, the revenues T are
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equal to the welfare maximizing revenues. [The interaction between p and N ] A larger
probability p of commitment by the mayor reduces the negative effect of N on revenues and
public spending If the mayor is weak, the parties will underprovide taxation, because they
will not internalize the benefit of their taxation on the public goods of the other groups.
This creates an inefficient provision of public goods in the municipality. If the mayor is
sufficiently strong, the parties will believe that she will link their contribution to their
public good, and that will induce the parties to increase their contribution up to the welfare
mazimizing revenues. Moreover, the reduction in taxation implied by a larger fragmentation
is mitigated by a larger political power of the mayor.
2.3 Evidence from Italian municipalities
In this section we first estimate the effect of parties’ fragmentation of the ruling coalition
on fiscal policies, using data on Italian municipalities. We present the results of a cross-
section analysis. Hereinafter, we propose a strategy that allows us to identify the causal
effect of parties fractionalization on government policies. In the second part, we use a
Regression Discontinuity Approach in order to identify the effect of mayors’ political power
on fiscal policies. Finally, we discuss the main results and we show how the effect of parties’
fragmentation and the effect of mayors’ power strongly interact each other.
Italian municipalities (Comuni) are the third-level administrative division of the State.
They are ruled by a city council (Consiglio Comunale) and an executive committee (Giunta),
headed by a mayor (Sindaco). Each municipality provides many of the basic civil functions,
which are, among others: registry of births and deaths, registry of deeds, contracting for
local roads and public works. Furthermore, it is in charge for the supply of a wide range of
services, such as waste management, municipal police, infrastructures, welfare, housing and
water supply.
2.3.1 Electoral System
Since 1993, in municipalities with a population exceeding 15,000 inhabitants a majoritarian
system with runoff is in place. The mayors are directly elected by voters, together with the
members of the city council. Each mayor can be connected to more than one party (lista).
The ballot paper is the same for both the election of the mayor and the city council. As
shown in Figure B.2, the name and surnames of the running mayors are written within a
specific rectangle, at whose side are the symbols of the party or parties connected to her. A
resident in the municipality has the opportunity to express at most two votes: one for the
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mayor and one for the party. The mayor and the party voted by a resident do not need to
be connected.
Given these characteristics, the results of the election can lead to different outcomes:
(1) if a candidate gets more than 50% votes, she is elected mayor; (2) if no candidate
gets more than 50% votes, there is a runoff election in 2 weeks among the two running
mayors who received the largest share of votes. Between the first and the second round,
parties which were not connected with the two candidates that run at the runoff, with a
formal procedure and with the approval of the candidate, can endorse one of the two runoff
candidates (Apparentamento). In this case they are fully part of the coalition of parties
supporting a candidate. The winner of the runoff election is elected mayor.
The distribution of seats in the city council is decided as follows: (1) if the coalition of
parties connected to the mayor receives a total share of votes larger than 60%, they get a
share of seats equivalent to their total share of votes; (2) If the total share of votes of the
coalition is between 40% and 60%, the total share of seats going to the mayor’s coalition is
60% (Majority bonus); (3) if the total share of votes of the mayor’s coalition is lower than
40% the total share of seats going to the mayor’s coalition corresponds to their total share
of votes (Mayor of minority).2 Inside the ruling coalition seats are allocated proportionally
to votes received by each party. Minority seats are distributed proportionally to all other
parties that obtain more than 3% of votes.
2.3.2 Database and Municipal Budget
The database contains the mayoral terms from 2002 to 2012 for about 1,000 Italian mu-
nicipalities.3 Data for this project come from multiple sources. The first source contains
information on all the election results from 1993 to today, and is available on the website of
the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs.4 As shown in Table B.1, it contains information on
the share of votes obtained by each candidate (for mayor) and party, the number of seats
assigned to each party and the electoral turnout. It contains also the name of every candi-
date and party. The names of running parties helped us determining whether the party is
right-wing or left-wing and, for each year, whether the mayor’s coalition is aligned with the
2This is indeed a very rare event.
3Some of the exercises that we perform in the following of the paper do not need all the data collected.
In these cases the exercises are performed with larger samples. The results do not show any significant
difference depending on the sample.
4http://elezionistorico.interno.it/.
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central government or not.5 Finally, from this source, we are able to determine whether,
between the two rounds, the winning mayor has been endorsed by parties that were linked
with other candidates in the first round.
The second source of information has been manually assembled by the authors, from
printed documents of the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs. It contains information on
the name of the candidates and parties and their position on the ballot paper from 2002 to
2012. Thanks to this database we can associate for all parties, their position in the ballot
with their share of votes. Since 1990, in Italy, after the approval of the Law No. 53/1990,
the position of names of candidates and symbols of parties in the ballot paper is randomly
determined by the state officials. In particular symbols of parties are randomized inside
the rectangle representing a single coalition. The main motivation of the law, as stated by
the proponents of law, was that it is common knowledge, although not scientifically proven,
that there are some positions in the ballot which give a boost in terms of votes. For this
reason, at every election, parties strongly competed in order to get the best positions.6
The third database contains all the details of the budgets of Italian municipalities from
1997 to 2014. It is also available on the website of the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs.7
The budget is the instrument through which the local government programs activities and
services for the current year. It shows the details of revenues and spending defined according
the needs and priorities of the municipalities. The budget formal procedure prescribes three
main stages. First, the mayor, together with assessors, prepares the first draft of the budget.
The main focus of this stage are the sources of revenues for the budget. Secondly, the
municipal government presents the draft to the city council, where a bargaining process to
define items takes place. Third, the final bill of the budget has to be approved with 50% plus
one of votes. Usually, the mayor and the parties of her coalition engage in a bargaining in
the different stages of the drafting procedure, in particular when spending items are decided.
There are features of the budget procedure that are important to mention. By law,
after the introduction of the Domestic Stability Pact (Patto di Stabilita´ Interno) in 1999,
municipalities face a tight budget constraint. Municipalities were constrained to keep the
growth of their fiscal gap - defined as deficit, net of transfers and debt service - under tight
control.
5In order to classify parties we apply the same method by Bracco et al. (2015).
6By the draft legislation: “Beyond any consideration on the merits of this effect, the fact is that these
races for the positions on the ballot resulted often in unpleasant episodes ... causing inopportune disturbance
of the climate of the electoral.”
7http://finanzalocale.interno.it/apps/floc.php/in/cod/4.
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The main revenue items analyzed in this work are: (1) Taxes : the real estate tax (IMU ),
the income tax (IRPEF ) and the tax on waste collection; (1) Fees & Tariffs that include
revenues from the supply of public services (fees for kindergarten, retirement homes, sports
facilities etc.), from exercising certain functions (fines made by the local police, parking lots
and public land rent) and from the management of certain activities or from ownership of
properties; (3) Central Transfers come from higher administrative level, mainly from the
state, but also from provinces and regions; (4) New Debt revenues from taking out loans
serving to finance investments.
The main expenditure items analysed in this work are: (1) Current Expenditure which
is used to fund ordinary management of services; (2) Capital Expenditure which is intended
to finance public works and real estates that produce repeated benefits over time, i.e. in-
vestments.
Finally, the database has been enriched with a series of information on time invariant ge-
ographical characteristics of the municipality and the available characteristics of the elected
mayor. Table B.1 shows some of these variables: the municipal area, the degree of urban-
ization, the seismicity class, the distance from the sea, the population, the presence of a
river, the altitude and finally the church density. Furthermore: the age, the sex, the level
of education and previous job of the elected mayors.
2.4 Empirical Strategy & Results
2.4.1 Cross-sectional analysis
In this framework we are interested in studying the effect of parties fragmentation Fcl on
fiscal policies. Our main explanatory variable Fcl is the normalized fractionalization index
of the ruling coalition. More in detail, we define Fcl as:
Fcl :=
∑N
i=1 si (1− si)
1− 1
N
(2.13)
where the normalizing factor (1 − 1
N
) includes N ,8 the number of running parties within
the coalition of mayors in the ballot; si is the share, within the ruling coalition, of seats
in the city council of each party i. As our interest lies in the fragmentation inside the city
council, we use N , which is a measure of the fragmentation before elections take place, in
8The unnormalized fractionalization goes from 0 to 1− 1N .
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the normalization. As it will be clear when we will present the IV estimation, we are able
to exploit random shocks on the fractionalization index, that keep N constant.
We exploit an index of fractionalization, instead of the number of parties in the ruling
coalition, in order to account for asymmetries in the distribution of seats inside the ruling
coalition. It is important to emphasize that the index of fractionalization and the number
of parties are highly correlated. We have performed all exercises with different measure of
fractionalization.9 Qualitatively, the key findings of the paper do not change.
Let Yct be one of the items of the municipal budget presented in the previous section.
For example, the current expenditure per capita of municipality c in year t. Our basic
specification is:
log (Yct) = α0 + α1Fcl + α2Vcl + α3Mcl + α4Xc + α5 log (Ycl−1) + µt + σe + θp + ctel (2.14)
where Vcl are control variables relative to electoral outcomes of the legislature l of city c,
as from panel A of Table B.1: the level of turnout, the percentage of votes obtained by
the mayor, if the mayor is elected at the runoff, if she is endorsed by parties other than
her original coalition and if they get seats, if the mayor is at her first or second term of
office and finally the main political ideology of the ruling coalition. Mcl are control variables
relative to mayor’s personal characteristics elected for the term l in city c. As from panel C
of Table B.1: age, sex, schooling and previous job of the elected mayor. The specification
includes time invariant geographical characteristics Xc, from panel B of Table B.1: the area
of the municipality in square kilometers, the degree of urbanization, the seismicity class, the
sea distance, the population size, the presence of a river, the altitude of the municipality
and the church density. Then, the specification also include the average level over the past
legislature of the dependent variable log (Ycl−1), year fixed effect µt, year of the legislature
fixed effect σe and number of running parties within the coalition of the mayor θp fixed
effect. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
Results: Cross-sectional analysis
Table B.3 presents the main results of our basic cross-sectional analysis, the effect of parties’
fractionalization on fiscal outcomes. Panel A of Table B.3 reports the results for public
expenditure and in particular panel A.1 total expenditure, panel A.2 current expenditure
and panel A.3 capital expenditure. The first columns of each sub-panel (1), (5) and (9)
9The effective number of parties, several index of fractionalization and the minimum winning coalition.
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report the specifications that include year fixed effect, year of the legislature fixed effect,
number of running parties fixed effect and the average level over the past legislature of the
dependent variable. The second columns (2), (6) and (11) include also the electoral outcomes
of the legislature. The specification of the third columns (3), (7) and (11) include also all the
time invariant geographical characteristics of the municipality. Finally, the fourth column
of each sub-panel include also the controls relative to mayor’s personal characteristics. The
panels B and C of table B.3 present results on revenues following the scheme described
above.
Results show that the effect of parties’ fractionalization on public expenditure is negative
and statistically significant in all the specifications. Higher is the parties fragmentation of the
ruling coalition lower is the total level of public expenditure. The effect of fractionalization
is negative for both current and capital spending.
Panels B & C of Table B.3 report the results for public revenues. Evidence shows that
the effect of parties’ fractionalization is negative on total revenues. In this case, in contrast
to public expenditure, the effect of political fractionalization is not negative on all revenue
items. Indeed, from panel B.2 we can see that the effect of parties fragmentation is negative
but never statistically different from zero for taxes. Instead, the coefficients are negative
and always statistically different from zero in the estimates of the effect of fractionalization
on fees & tariffs. Panel C shows that the effect of parties fragmentation is positive but never
statistically different from zero for central transfers, panel C.2. Furthermore, the effect is
positive and statistically different from zero in column (3) & (4) for new debt. Finally, from
panel C.3 estimates show that the effect of fractionalization is never statistically different
from zero and the point estimates of coefficients are much smaller than in the empirical
exercices already presented. The estimates of the effect of fractionalization on the deficit
are coherent with the results on total spending and revenues of panel A.1 & B.1. Indeed,
given that the effect of fractionalization is almost equal for total spending and total revenues,
it follows that the effect on their difference is zero.10.
So far, we have seen that a higher level of fractionalization of the ruling coalition is
associated with a lower lever of both total spending and total revenues. Furthermore,
parties fractionalization has a negative effect only on revenues that come from fees and
tariffs. Fees and tariffs are a good proxy of taxation, analysed in our theory, that target
groups of residents who use specific public goods. Finally, evidence corroborates the results
10As a proxy of the deficit we use also the fiscal gap and the results are equivalent with those of panel
C.3.
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by Grembi et al. (2015). Indeed, there is no effect of fractionalization on deficit, this is
further evidence that the budget constraint is binding.
The estimates are robust to various specifications and controls. In particular, it is impor-
tant to emphasize that including the number of running parties fixed effect we are estimating
the effect of the fragmentation of parties that are present in the city council, controlling for
any possible effect driven by a possible pre-election bargaining. Nevertheless, all of these
results have a potential econometric problem: omitted unobservable confounding factors
that can affect both the fragmentation of parties and fiscal policy. Mainly, unobservable
characteristics of the mayor or latent characteristics of the municipality could drive the
results.
In order to solve this potential econometric problem in the next session we present an
IV strategy. As in an experiment, we exploit a random boost of votes which modifies the
fractionalization of the ruling coalition of a municipality in a given legislature.
2.4.2 IV estimate
The Ballot Order Effect
The ballot order effect defined as the relation between the order of symbols of parties and/or
names of candidates on a voting ballot and the distribution of votes. The existence and
relevance of this relation has been the focus of a part of the political science literature.
Some empirical works provide evidence of this of effects (i.e., Miller and Krosnick (1998),
Ho and Imai (2008) and Meredith and Salant (2013)). The empirical literature has shown
that, when parties are simply listed in the ballot, the first and the last party get a boost of
votes . However, as shown in Figure B.2, in this setting the parties are not simply listed in
the ballot. Indeed, it can be seen that the combination of symbols and names of the Italian
ballot is quite articulated. Cervellati et al. (2016), using the same database of this paper,
show that the focal point of this ballot is the party whose symbol is closer to the name of
the candidate (for mayor). Since 1990, the positions in the ballot paper of candidates and of
parties within each coalition are randomly determined by state officials. Due to the feature
of the Italian system, the authors identify the causal effect of the position on the percentage
of votes obtained by each running mayor and party. First, Cervellati et al. (2016) show that
there is no evidence of a specific pattern in the distribution of positions, suggesting that
indeed the order is randomly assigned. Furthermore, authors show that there is no effect of
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the position of the candidates on their share of votes.11
In particular, Cervellati et al. (2016) provide evidence of a focal point in the box of a
coalition, that seems to attract a disproportionate amount of voters. The symbol of the
party, which is located on the right of the name of the candidate, has on average a larger
share of votes, within coalition.
Hence, the main specification that Cervellati et al. (2016) estimate in order to identify
the effect of the focal point position follows:
SVi = δ0 + δ1FPi + δ3Vlc + µt + ηc + θp + εctel (2.15)
where SVi is the share of votes within the coalition of party i and FPi (Focal Point) is a
dummy that takes value 1 if the party’s symbol is on the right of the name candidate, 0
otherwise. The specification includes control variables relative to electoral outcomes of the
legislature l of city c, year fixed effect µt, number of running parties within the coalition θp
fixed effect and city fixed effect ηc. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
It is important to underline that when there is an odd number of running parties within
the coalition, the name of candidate is always aligned with a symbol of a party. For example,
as can be seen in Figure B.2, in the case of three parties the name of the candidate is close
to the second party. Instead, when there is an even number of running parties within the
coalition, the name of the candidate is in the middle between two parties. For example,
in the case of four running parties the name of the candidates is in the middle between
the second and the third party. When an even number of running parties are running, the
variable FPi takes values one only for the first of the two median parties. For example, in
the case of four running parties it takes value one only for the second party.
Figure B.3 shows the share of votes of parties within coalition, by position in the ballot
paper according the number of running parties in the coalition. These figure show that on
average the party that is in the focal point gets more votes. When three parties are running,
due to randomization, each party on average should obtain the 33% of votes, if no ballot
order effect is active. However it is observed that the first and the last party on average
obtain less than 33% of votes and the party in the focal point obtains more than 33% of
votes. The same path is observed in all other graphs of Figure B.3.
Panel A of Table B.4 reports the estimates of specification (2.15). Column (1) to column
11Discussing and understanding the causes of the Ballot Order Effect is outside the scope of this paper.
However, Cervellati et al. (2016) provide a deep discussion aimed at understanding the causes.
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(7) report the results by number of running parties, separately. In Column (8) and (9),
respectively, are reported all the coalitions with more than three and less than seven running
parties and all the coalitions with more than three and less than ten parties. Finally, in
column (10) are reported the results with all the coalitions with more than three parties.
Parties that randomly end up at the focal position gets more votes than others parties.
From column (1), coalition with three lists, the party at the focal point obtains 5.25% point
more votes within the coalition than other parties. Panel B of Table B.4 shows that the
estimates are robust to various specifications and controls. Overall, evidence show that the
effect is larger when the number of parties in the coalition is odd. Probably, the two parties
close two the name of the candidate share part of the boost of votes when there is an even
number of parties.
From a political point of view the magnitude of the effect is extremely high. Due to
the proportional distribution of seats a reallocation of 4 percentage of point, significantly
change the balances of power within the ruling coalition. The minimum threshold to get at
least one seats in many cases is lower the 4 percentage point. Panel B of table B.5 shows
the effect of the focal point on the probability that the party gets at least one seats. The
dependent variable is a dummy that takes value one if the party has obtained at least one
seat, 0 otherwise. The party in the focal point has an higher probability to get at least one
seat that ranges from 5 to 18 percentage points than other parties. Practically, this means
that in Italy on average the 10% of councilors is elected by pure chance.
The Instrument
The intuition behind the instrument is quite simple. If a party that is relatively small, in
term of electoral support, is randomly located in focal point, the distribution of seats within
the ruling coalition of the mayor is more fractionalized. On the other side, if a relatively
large party is randomly located in the focal point the distribution of seats would be, by
chance, more concentrated. In order to proxy the relative electoral support of the party
that is treated within the coalition we build the variable RPfp (Ranking of the Party in the
Focal Point). For example, when the coalition is composed by three running parties, the
variable RPfp takes value 1 if the treated party takes the largest share of votes, it takes value
2 if the party receives the second largest share of votes and 3 if the treated party takes the
smallest share of votes. From Figure B.4 we can notice that there is a negative relationship
between the ranking of a party in the focal point and its share of votes. Thus, we have a
good proxy for the relative size of the treated party within the coalition. Moreover, Figure
B.5 shows that there is a positive relationship between the ranking of the treated party and
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the fractionalization index Fcl. That is, smaller is the treated party, larger is the parties’
fractionalization within the ruling coalition.
In order to identify the causal effect of parties’ fractionalization on fiscal policies we
implement a two-stage least squares model where the first stage is
F̂cl = β0 + β1RPfp + β2Vcl + β3Mcl + β4Xc + β5 log (Ycl−1) + µt + σe + θp + υctel (2.16)
and the second stage is
log (Yct) = pi0 + pi1F̂cl + pi2Vcl + pi3Mcl + pi4Xc + pi5 log (Ycl−1) + µt + σe + θp + uctel (2.17)
Both specifications include all the controls already presented in section 2.4.1. Standard
errors are clustered at the municipality level.
Is the Ranking a Valid Instrument?
For this IV methodology to correctly identify the causal effect of fractionalization on fis-
cal outcomes, the instrument must satisfy three conditions: (a) the ranking of the party
in the focal point is correlated with the fractionalization index (first stage relevance); (b)
the ranking of the party is uncorrelated with the econometric error u (second stage inde-
pendence); and (c) the ranking of the party has no impact on log (Yct) other than through
fractionalization index (second stage exclusion).
Table B.6 report the estimates of equation (2.16). Panel A.2 of Table B.6 contains the
sample of all the candidates, while panel B.2 contains the sample with only the elected may-
ors. Results show that the ranking of the party in the focal point has a strong positive effect
on both the fractionalization index and the number of parties within the ruling coalition of
the mayor. The coefficients are always statistically significant at the 99% level. The results
are pretty robust both when we estimate the coefficients including in the sample all running
coalitions, panel A.2, and when we use only the subsample of mayors, panel B.2 of Table
B.6.
For what concerns the exogeneity of the instrument, by construction, the treated party is
randomly drawn by the state officials which means that is uncorrelated with the econometric
error u.
The exclusion restriction imposes that the ranking of the party in the focal point does
not affect fiscal outcomes other than through an increase in the fragmentation of the ruling
coalition. Panel A.1 and B.1 show the estimates of equation (2.16) using some characteristics
of the ruling coalition as dependent variable other than the fractionalization index. In
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column (1) and (2) the share of votes of the running mayor is used as dependent variable.
In column (3) and (4) the total number of seats obtained by the coalitions. Column (5) and
(6) report the results for the probability of runoff alliances, while column (7) and (8) report
the probability that new parties endorsing the mayor obtain seats with the city council.
Finally, in column (9) and (10) the probability that the coalition candidate goes to the
runoff is used as depend variable and in column (11) and (12) the probability of becoming
a mayor. These estimates show that the ranking of the party in the focal point has on none
effect of this variable. The ranking of the party in the focal point does not affect any of
the characteristics of the coalition as a whole. This is because the ballot order effect does
not affect the total number of votes of a coalition but only the distribution of seats within
coalition.
As a further evidence, we estimates 2000 times the coefficient β1 using the ranking of a
randomly drawn party within the coalition. The graphs of Figure B.6 shows the results of
the estimates, using the fractionalization index (graph on the left) and the number of parties
(graph on the right). Only in the 5% of the cases the coefficients are statistically different
from zero (orange points), and they are equally distributes around zero. In contrast, in the
95% of the cases estimated coefficients are not statistically different from zero, and also in
this case they are homogeneously distributed around zero. This shows that is indeed the
boost of votes obtained by the focal party that has an effect on the fractionalization index.
However, a main concern can arise coding the ballot order effect in this way. In order
to build the variable Ranking of the Party at the Focal Point (RPfp) we are using the post
treatment distribution of votes. Ideally, in order to build the variable RPfp, we would like
to use the votes that parties would have obtained excluding the boost induced by the ballot
order effect. Indeed, the focal point has an effect also on the ranking of the party. We have
two main arguments against this possible issue. First, it lowers the power of our instrument.
Indeed, if we could have used the pretreatment ranking the point estimate of the coefficient
beta1 would have been higher. Second, as long as the ballot order effect increases the ranking
of the party in the focal point on average only by one position, the monotonicity assumption
holds.12
12We cannot directly test this assumption.
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Results: IV Strategy
Table B.7 presents the results of the IV strategy, the effect of parties’ fractionalization on
fiscal outcomes. Panel A of Table B.7 reports the results for public expenditure, while panels
B and C of table B.3 present results on public revenues. The results are listed following the
scheme described in section 2.4.1.
The IV estimates indicate that the parties’ fractionalization has a negative effects on to-
tal public expenditure, panel A.1. The coefficients are negative and statistically significant
at the 95% level. The effect of fractionalization is negative for both current and capital
spending. However, in the last two columns of panel A.3, the effect of parties’ fragmen-
tation on capital expenditure is not statistically different from 0. The point estimate of
coefficients is quite high, although not statistically significant, indicating that the effect is
highly heterogeneous.
At the bottom row of panel A, we show that the ranking of the party in the focal point
is a strong instrument for parties’ fractionalization, with F statistics is beyond the typical
rules-of-thumb values.
In addition, the results on revenues are in line with those shown in the cross-section anal-
ysis. The effect of fractionalization on total revenues is negative and statistically different
from 0. Again, the effect on revenues is completely concentrated on fees & tariffs. The esti-
mates of all revenues items other than fees & tariffs do not show any significant coefficients.
It is important to underline that the point estimate of coefficients of new debt, panel C.1,
is high, although not statistically significant suggesting that the effect of fractionalization
on new debt is highly heterogeneous. At the bottom row of panel B are reported first stage
F statistics. Also in case we can conclude that the instrument is strong.
Overall, the IV approach yields consistent evidence with those of the cross-section anal-
ysis presented in section 2.4.1. Fractionalization has a strong negative effect on spending
and revenues. The estimates of Table B.7 show that the effect is sizable. An increment of
10% in the fractionalization index at mean value implies a reduction of about 5.7% in total
expenditure and total revenues and a reduction of fees and tariffs of about 7.1%.
2.4.3 Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD)
This estimation framework identifies the effect of being elected at the second round, as
opposed of being elected at the first round, on fiscal outcomes. In this setting we compare
mayors that have barely won at the first round, the ones that have obtained slightly more
than 50% votes, with those who barely go at the second round because they obtained
slightly less than 50%. The identifying assumption in this regression discontinuity analysis
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is that mayor close to the threshold of the 50% are randomly assigned across the rounds,
independently of mayors characteristics. This assumption could be criticized if elections are
rigged, such that winning at the first round could depend on personal characteristics of the
mayors that are also correlated with spending behavior. However, the graph of Figure B.7
shows that there is no evidence of such manipulation around the threshold, which is the
focus of this exercise. In a small window around the threshold, mayors elected at the first
round and mayors elected at the second round are identical in terms of many observable
characteristics such as age, schooling and previous job of the elected. Also the characteristics
of the cities do not show significant differences at the threshold, such as population, having
a river, sea distance, north and south cities and most important, the level of turnout at the
election, the number of running mayors and the total number of running parties within the
city council.13 The graph of Figure B.8 show that the raw densities of mayors do not do
show a systematic selection of mayor in one of the two rounds. This is a further evidence
that there is no manipulation at the threshold. Finally, the two bottom graph of Figure B.9
show that mayors elected at the first round and mayors elected at the second round do not
differ also with respect to our main independent variable of the previous section, the parties
fractionalization and the number of parties of the ruling coalition.
Let Yct be one of the items of the municipal budget, the variable Rm is 1 if the mayor
is not elected at the first round, 0 otherwise. Then, P ∗m is the normalized share of votes
P ∗m = Pm − Ps, where Pm is share of votes obtained by the mayor and Ps is equal to 50.
Thus, the sample is restricted to the interval Pm ∈ [Pm − h, Pm + h] and a model of this
form is estimated.
log (Yct) = ϕ0 + ϕ1Rm + ϕ2
N∑
n=1
P ∗m
n + ϕ3
N∑
n=1
(Rm × P ∗mn)+
+ϕ4Vcl + ϕ5Mcl + ϕ6Xc + ϕ6 log (Ycl−1) + µt + σe + θp + ξctel
(2.18)
As suggested by the literature, both local linear regression, with n = 1, and spline polyno-
mial approximation, with n > 1, are performed. Equation (2.18) contains all the control
and fixed effect presented in the previous sections. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level.
13We perform also the RDD estimates on these variables and none of them results statistically different
from zero. Results available upon request.
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Results: Regression Discontinuity Design
Results are reported in Table B.7. Panel A lists the results for public expenditure: in
panel A.1 the outcome is total expenditure, in panel A.2 current expenditure and in panel
A.3 capital expenditure. The first two columns of each sub-panel present the results of a
local linear regression model, according (2.18). The optimal bandwidth h is estimated either
following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) (Columns (1), (5) and (9)), or implementing the
algorithm presented by Calonico et al. (013a,b) ((2), (6) and (11)). The last two columns
of each sub-panel show the results for a spline polynomial approximation as in equation
(2.18), and two different orders of the polynomial are presented. A 2nd order approximation
in columns (2), (6) and (11), and a 3rd order approximation in columns (3), (7) and (11).
The panels B and C of table B.7 present results for revenues following the scheme described
above.
Results reported in panel A.1, A.2 and A.3 of Table B.7 show that if a mayor is elected at
the second round, she has a lower expenditure. In fact, the coefficients of all the regressions
are negative, but rarely statistically different from 0. Column (5) shows that a second round
mayor spends 10% less on current expenditure than a mayor elected at the first round.
Column (9)-(12) al panel B.3 show that the effect of being elected at the runoff has a
strong negative effect on fees and tariffs. A mayor elected at the second round collect about
30% less revenues from fees and tariffs than a mayor elected at the first round. Again, the
effect is concentrated on fees and tariffs.
Overall, standard errors are quite large, indicating that the effect of being elected at the
second round is highly heterogeneous. This does not allow to accurately identify the effect.
A graphical representation of the results on fiscal policies is provided in Figure B.11.
The overall message that we obtain from these graphs is that mayors elected at the first
round, those on the right of the threshold in the graphs, on average spend more and collect
more revenues. However, the jump at the threshold are not always statistically different
from 0.
2.4.4 Results: Interaction
In this section we are interested in studying if the effect of parties fractionalization on fiscal
policies is heterogeneous between mayors who barely are elected at the second round and
mayors who barely are elected at the first round. In other words, we want to verify if the
two effects studied in the previous sections, the effect of political fractionalization and the
effect of mayors’ political power, interact each other.
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In order to identify this effect we estimate the following full-interacted model:
log (Yct) = ψ0 + ψ1Rm + ψ2Fcl + ψ3Rm × Fcl + ψ4
N∑
n=1
P ∗m
n+
+ψ5
N∑
n=1
(Rm × P ∗mn) + ψ6Fcl ×
N∑
n=1
P ∗m
n + ψ7Fcl
N∑
n=1
(RmP
∗
m
n) + C + ωctel
(2.19)
where, C = ψ8Vcl + ψ9Mcl + ψ10Xc + ψ11 log (Ycl−1) + µt + σe + θp, are the controls already
presented in section 2.4.1. The sample is restricted to the interval Pm ∈ [Pm − h, Pm + h]
and both local linear regression, with n = 1, and spline polynomial approximation, with
n > 1, are performed. We are interested at the following coefficients: ψ2 which identifies
the effect of parties’ fractionalization on fiscal policies for mayors that are elected at the
first round; ψ2 + ψ3 which identifies the effect of parties’ fractionalization for mayors that
are elected at the second round; and finally ψ3, which shows if the effect of fractionalization
on fiscal policies is statistically different between the two different mayors. Standard errors
are clustered at the municipality level.
Panel A of Table B.9 reports the estimates of the model (2.19). The columns of the panels
A, B and C are presented following the scheme described in section 2.4.3. In the first row
of each panel we reporter the coefficient ψ2, the effect for mayors elected at the first round.
In the second row the effect for mayors elected at the second round ψ2 +ψ3. Finally, in the
bottom row of each panel the difference between the two effect, ψ3 is reported. Panel A of
Table B.9 shows that the effect of parties’ fractionalization is highly heterogeneous between
the two mayors. The first row shows that the effect on total expenditure is positive, although
never statistically different from 0, for mayors elected at the first round. On the contrary,
from the second row, the effect of parties’ fractionalization is shown to be highly negative
and in all specifications statistically significant at 99% level for mayors elected at the second
round. In all specifications listed in panel A.1 the difference between the two coefficients
is statistically different from 0, indicating that indeed the effect between the two groups
of mayors is highly heterogeneous. The results for current and capital expenditure almost
follow those of the total expenditure. The effect of fractionalization for mayors who win at
the first round disappears completely.
Panel B of Table B.9 shows the same pattern observed in section 2.4.1. The coefficients of
parties’ fractionalization on total revenues are similar to those of total spending for mayors
that are elected at the second round. Also in this case the effect for mayors elected at
the first round is never statistically different from 0. An important thing to emphasize is
that the only case in which coefficients are still statistically significant for mayors elected
2.5. Conclusion 47
at the first round are those of fees and tariffs. Indeed, frow the first rom of panel B.3, we
can see that the effect is negative and statistically significant, the point estimate is about
-0.65. This means that an increase of 10% in the fractionalization index at mean value
implies a reduction of about 4.6% in fees and tariffs for mayors elected at the first round.
The second row of panel B.3 shows that the effect almost double for mayors elected at the
second round. The point estimate is about 1.21. This means that an increase of 10% in the
fractionalization index at mean value implies a reduction of about 8.5% in fees and tariffs
for mayors elected at the second round. Also in this case the difference between the two
coefficients is statistically different from 0, as become clear in the third row of panel B.3.
Panel C of Table B.9 shows that there are no differences between the two groups of
mayors for what concerns the effect of parties fractionalization on new debt, central transfer
and deficit. Although, it is important to underline that the effect of parties frationalization
on new debt is positive and statistically significant for mayors elected at the first round.
2.5 Conclusion
The lack of fiscal responsability induced by large political coalitions in modern democracies
is often deemed as one of the main drivers of the substantial increase in public expenditure
in the last 40 years, up to levels far higher than what a benevolent social planner would
have chosen. In this paper we show that this is not always the case.
We study the effect of the political fragmentation of a ruling coalition on fiscal policies.
We show that when a government has a tight budget constraint, a larger number of parties
in the majority coalition reduces revenues and spending. Each party internalizes the whole
cost of the contribution made by the group of citizens she represents, but only a fraction
of the benefit. Moreover, we show that a politically strong mayor can solve this problem
of underprovision making a credible commitment about the link between what the group
gives as taxation and what the group receives in terms of public spending. We test this
theory using a new database on the ballot order of parties in Italian municipal elections
and introducing a novel instrument for parties’ fragmentation of the ruling coalition. Since
1990, in Italy the position of parties in the ballot paper is randomized. By exploiting the
ballot order effect, the paper identifies the causal effect of party fragmentation on fiscal
policies. Moreover, exploiting a regression discontinuity design at the voting threshold that
determines the runoff, we identify the effect of the political power of the mayor on fiscal
policy and the effect of its interplay with the parties’ fragmentation of the ruling coalition.
Empirical evidence confirms our predictions.
Our theory makes it possible to analyse the welfare implications of a reduction of spend-
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ing and revenues, implied by a large political fragmentation. Specifically, it suggests that
increasing the fragmentation of a ruling coalition gives rise to underspending, with respect
to the welfare maximizing level of public expenditure.
We should be careful in providing policy implications. Indeed, electoral rules that reduce
the number of parties, would on one side minimize the undercontribution analysed in this
work, but on the other side could lead to lower political representation, damaging the
welfare of the individuals whose interests are not defended in the ruling coalition. Still,
the empirical analysis on the polical power of the mayor suggests that a careful design of
political institutions, that keeps potentially a large number of parties in the decision making
process, balancing them with a strong leader, could lead to substantial welfare gains.
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Appendix A
Do Electoral Systems Affect the Incumbent Probability of Re-election?
A.1 Tables and Figures
Table A.1: Legislative Thresholds for Italian Municipalities
Pre-Reform n. 81 of 1993 Post-Reform n. 81 of 1993
Population Ex.
Com.
Size
Council
Size
Electoral Rule Ex.
Com.
Size
Council
Size
Electoral Rules Wage
Mayor
Below 1,000 4 15 Plurality System
with Panachage
4 12 Plurality System
Single-Round
1,291
1,000-3,000 4 15 Plurality System
with Panachage
4 12 Plurality System
Single-Round
1,446
3,000-5,000 6 20 Plurality System
with Panachage
4 16 Plurality System
Single-Round
2,169
5,000-10,000 6 20 Party-List
Proportional System
4 16 Plurality System
Single-Round
2,789
10,000-15,000 6 30 Party-List
Proportional System
6 20 Plurality System
Single-Round
3,099
15,000-30,000 6 30 Party-List
Proportional System
6 20 Majority System
with Runoff
3,099
30,000-50,000 8 40 Party-List
Proportional System
6 30 Majority System
with Runoff
3,460
50,000-100,000 8 40 Party-List
Proportional System
6 30 Majority System
with Runoff
4,132
100,000-
250,000
12 50 Party-List
Proportional System
10 40 Majority System
with Runoff
5,010
250,000-
500,000
15 60 Party-List
Proportional System
12 46 Majority System
with Runoff
5,784
Above 500000 16-18 80 Party-List
Proportional System
14-16 50-60 Majority System
with Runoff
7,798
Note. Population is the number of inhabitants living in a city measured by the last available Census. Since in Italy is
made every ten years, in this work I used the Census of 1991. Executive Committee is the maximum number of Assessors
that the Mayor can appointed. Council Size is the number of seats available in the city council. Electoral Rules is the
specific electoral system in force in that municipality. The number of members of the executive committee, the number
of seats available in the city conical and the electoral systems vary according to the population size of the city. Moreover
on march 25, 1993, the law 81 on the direct election of the mayor has modified both the number of the heading organs
of local government that the electoral systems. Wage Mayor refer to the monthly gross wage of the mayor in 2000 and is
measured in euros. The Pre-Reform n. 81 of 1993, with respect to our analysis, refers to the period from 1985 to 1992,
and Post-Reform n. 81 of 1993 refers to the period from 1993 to 2000.
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Table A.4: Descriptive Statistics, Difference-in-Discontinuities Design Sample
The Whole Period Pre-Reform n. 81 Post-Reform n. 81
Cities Cities Cities Cities Cities Cities
above 5,000 below 5,000 above 5,000 below 5,000 above 5,000 below 5,000
N. of City 488 983 488 983 488 983
N. of Election per City 2.83 2.85 1.04 1.02 1.95 1.96
% of Mayors Re-elected 37.36 42.17 25.11 36.64 42.90 44.68
% of Re-elected Councillors 33.61 29.82 42.06 36.36 28.55 26.12
% of Re-elected Assessors 23.37 21.75 23.74 22.75 23.03 20.91
% Libraries Activated 6.78 8.80 18.83 24.48 1.36 1.70
Fraction of Reshuﬄing 27.75 27.00 42.15 40.88 21.18 20.63
% of Early dissolution 10.93 6.95 21.86 9.13 5.99 5.96
Length of the Legislature 4.30 4.43 4.57 4.83 3.86 4.87
Schooling of the City Council 12.85 12.14 12.59 11.76 12.97 12.46
Schooling of the Board 13.25 12.82 12.75 12.07 13.58 13.16
Schooling of Mayors 14.62 14.49 14.21 13.98 14.81 14.71
% of Mayors Male 0.92 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.91 0.93
Note. The whole period refers to the period from 1985 to 2000. Then, the Pre-Reform n. 81 of 1993 refers to the
period from 1985 to 1992, and Post-Reform n. 81 of 1993 refers to the period from 1993 to 2000. Cities above 5,000
include cities between 5,000 and 7,000 thousand inhabitants, and Cities below 5,000 refer to cities between 3,000 and 5,000
inhabitants. Number of Election per City is the average number of observation that I have for each cities in that specific
period of time. % of Mayors Re-elected is the percentage of Mayors re-elected in a specific time span. % of Councillors and
Assessors Re-elected is the percentage of Councillors and Assessors re-elected on the total political population, excluded
the Mayors, it is not the average of the percentage of the re-elected by cities. % Libraries Activated is the percentage
of libraries opened or activated in a specific time span. Fraction of Reshuﬄing is the fraction of elected politicians that
during the legislature have held more than role % of Early dissolution is the percentage of Municipalities that have faced
an anticipated dissolution of the legislative term. Length of the Legislature in the average length of the legislative term in
year.Schooling of the City Council, of the Board, of the Mayors are the average of years of education for the Councillors,
Assessors and Mayors. Ratio of Male Mayorsis the fraction of male that have been elected as Mayor.
Table A.5: Descriptive Statistics, Pre/Post Sample
The Whole Period Pre-Reform n. 81 Post-Reform n. 81
Cities Cities Cities Cities Cities Cities
above 5,000 below 5,000 above 5,000 below 5,000 above 5,000 below 5,000
Number of City 1,222 4,651 1,222 4,651 1,222 4,651
Number of Election per City 2.81 2.85 1.03 1.01 1.96 1.97
% of Mayors Re-elected 37.37 49.48 25.84 46.45 42.37 50.84
% of Councillors Re-elected 33.77 34.41 42.30 45.06 28.64 30.50
% of Assessors Re-elected 22.56 25.51 22.88 27.42 22.30 23.25
% of Early dissolution 12.57 5.04 24.20 5.75 7.53 4.71
Length of the Legislature 4.27 4.48 4.56 4.89 3.82 3.88
Schooling of the City Council 13.04 11.33 12.75 10.79 13.16 11.58
Schooling of the Board 13.55 11.67 12.97 10.93 13.81 12.00
Schooling of the Mayors 14.72 13.56 14.18 13.05 14.96 13.79
Ratio of Male Mayors 0.92 0.94 0.94 0.96 0.91 0.93
Note. The whole period refers to the period from 1985 to 2000. Then, the Pre-Reform n. 81 of 1993 refers to the period
from 1985 to 1992, and Post-Reform n. 81 of 1993 refers to the period from 1993 to 2000. The all sample of cities is
divided in to two subsample. The Medium incluse cities between 5,000 and 15,000 thousand inhabitants, and finally Small
that refers to cities with less than 5,000 thousand inhabitants. Number of Election per City is the average number of
observation that I have for each cities in that specific period of time. % of Mayors Re-elected is the percentage of Mayors
re-elected in a specific time span. % of Councillors and Assessors Re-elected is the percentage of Councillors and Assessors
re-elected on the total political population, excluded the Mayors, it is not the average of the percentage of the re-elected by
cities. % of Early dissolution is the percentage of Municipalities that have faced an anticipated dissolution of the legislative
term. Length of the Legislature in the average length of the legislative term in year.Schooling of the City Council, of the
Board, of the Mayors are the average of years of education for the Councillors, Assessors and Mayors. Ratio of Male
Mayors is the fraction of male that have been elected as Mayor.
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Figure A.1: Difference-in-Discontinuities for Mayors Re-elected
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Note. Municipalities between 3,000 and 7,000 thousand inhabitants. Top graph: difference-
in-discontinuities. Vertical axis: difference between the probability of re-election for mayor
before the reform (i.e. before 1993) and the probability of re-election for mayor after the reform
(i.e. after 1993, included). Central graph (left): regression discontinuity. Vertical axis: the
probability of re-election for mayor before the reform (i.e. before 1993). Central graph (right):
regression discontinuity. Vertical axis: the probability of re-election for mayor after the reform
(i.e. before 1993). Bottom graph (left): regression discontinuity. Vertical axis: the probability
of re-election for mayor in the first election after the reform. Bottom graph (right): regression
discontinuity. Vertical axis: the probability of re-election for mayor in the second election after
the reform. Horizontal axis (for all graphs): 1991 census population size minus 5,000. The
central line is a spline 3rd-order polynomial fit; the latter lines represent the 95% confidence
interval. Scatter points are averaged over intervals of 50 inhabitants.
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Figure A.2: Difference-in-Discontinuities for Councillors Re-elected
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Note. Municipalities between 3,000 and 7,000 thousand inhabitants. Top graph: difference-
in-discontinuities. Vertical axis: difference between the probability of re-election for councillors
before the reform (i.e. before 1993) and the probability of re-election for councillors after the
reform (i.e. after 1993, included). Central graph (left): regression discontinuity. Vertical axis:
the probability of re-election for councillors before the reform (i.e. before 1993). Central graph
(right): regression discontinuity. Vertical axis: the probability of re-election for councillors after
the reform (i.e. before 1993). Bottom graph (left): regression discontinuity. Vertical axis: the
probability of re-election for councillors in the first election after the reform. Bottom graph
(right): regression discontinuity. Vertical axis: the probability of re-election for councillors in
the second election after the reform. Horizontal axis (for all graphs): 1991 census population
size minus 5,000. The central line is a linear fit; the latter lines represent the 95% confidence
interval. Scatter points are averaged over intervals of 50 inhabitants.
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Figure A.3: Difference-in-Discontinuities for Assessors Re-elected
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Note. Municipalities between 3,000 and 7,000 thousand inhabitants. Top graph: difference-
in-discontinuities. Vertical axis: difference between the probability of re-election for assessors
before the reform (i.e. before 1993) and the probability of re-election for assessors after the
reform (i.e. after 1993, included). Central graph (left): regression discontinuity. Vertical axis:
the probability of re-election for assessors before the reform (i.e. before 1993). Central graph
(right): regression discontinuity. Vertical axis: the probability of re-election for assessors after
the reform (i.e. before 1993). Bottom graph (left): regression discontinuity. Vertical axis:
the probability of re-election for assessors in the first election after the reform. Bottom graph
(right): regression discontinuity. Vertical axis: the probability of re-election for assessors in
the second election after the reform. Horizontal axis (for all graphs): 1991 census population
size minus 5,000. The central line is a linear fit; the latter lines represent the 95% confidence
interval. Scatter points are averaged over intervals of 50 inhabitants.
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Figure A.4: Difference-in-Discontinuities for Having a Library
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Note. Municipalities between 3,000 and 7,000 thousand inhabitants. Top graph: difference-
in-discontinuities. Vertical axis: difference between Probability of Having a Library before the
reform (i.e. before 1993) and Probability of Having a Library after the reform (i.e. after 1993,
included). Central graph (left): regression discontinuity. Vertical axis: Probability of Having
a Library before the reform (i.e. before 1993). Central graph (right): regression discontinuity.
Vertical axis: Probability of Having a Library after the reform (i.e. before 1993). Bottom
graph (left): regression discontinuity. Vertical axis: Probability of Having a Library in the
first election after the reform. Bottom graph (right): regression discontinuity. Vertical axis:
Probability of Having a Library in the second election after the reform. Horizontal axis (for
all graphs): 1991 census population size minus 5,000. The central line is a linear fit; the latter
lines represent the 95% confidence interval. Scatter points are averaged over intervals of 50
inhabitants.
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Figure A.5: Difference-in-Discontinuities for the Probability of Having a Reshuﬄing Higher than
1
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Note. Municipalities between 3,000 and 7,000 thousand inhabitants. Top graph (left):
difference-in-discontinuities. Vertical axis: difference between the probability of having a reshuf-
fling higher than 13 before the reform (i.e. before 1993) and the probability of having a reshuﬄing
higher than 13 after the reform (i.e. after 1993, included). Top graph (right): difference-in-
discontinuities. Vertical axis: difference between the probability of having a reshuﬄing higher
than 25 before the reform (i.e. before 1993) and the probability of having a reshuﬄing higher
than 25 after the reform (i.e. after 1993, included). Bottom graph (left): difference-in-
discontinuities. Vertical axis: difference between the probability of having a reshuﬄing higher
than 12 before the reform (i.e. before 1993) and the probability of having a reshuﬄing higher
than 12 after the reform (i.e. after 1993, included). Bottom graph (right): difference-in-
discontinuities. Vertical axis: difference between the probability of having a reshuﬄing higher
than 35 before the reform (i.e. before 1993) and the probability of having a reshuﬄing higher
than 35 before the reform after the reform (i.e. after 1993, included). Horizontal axis (for all
graphs): 1991 census population size minus 5,000. The central line is a linear fit; the latter
lines represent the 95% confidence interval. Scatter points are averaged over intervals of 50
inhabitants.
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Table A.6: The Effect of the Majoritarian System, Difference-in-Discontinuities Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IK CCT poly 2rd poly 3rd
A. Dependent Variable: Re-election Probability of Mayor
Majoritarian System 0.1213* 0.1895* 0.1387 0.2826**
(0.065) (0.112) (0.099) (0.136)
h. 1,992 693 2,000 2,000
Observations 4,178 1,322 4,201 4,201
R-squared 0.0150 0.0216 0.0163 0.0178
F-test Population var. p-value 0.361 0.0431
B. Dependent Variable: Re-election Probability of Councilor
Majoritarian System 0.0088 0.0101 -0.0118 0.0032
(0.029) (0.031) (0.028) (0.036)
h. 898 705 2,000 2,000
Observations 30,112 23,517 72,863 72,863
R-squared 0.0175 0.0155 0.0168 0.0170
F-test Population var. p-value 0.161 0.0885
C. Dependent Variable: Re-election Probability of Assessors
Majoritarian System 0.0155 0.0347 0.0030 0.0388
(0.031) (0.045) (0.042) (0.054)
h. 1,751 756 2,000 2,000
Observations 15,999 6,612 19,127 19,127
R-squared 0.0017 0.0012 0.0016 0.0018
F-test Population var. p-value 0.235 0.233
Note. Municipalities between 3,000 and 7,000 thousand inhabitants. Dependent variable:
Panel A The probability of being re-elected for a mayor. Panel B The probability of being
re-elected for a councilor. Panel C The probability of being re-elected for an assessor.
Difference-in-discontinuities design to estimate the causal effect of the plurality system with
panachage. Estimation methods: Local linear probability model as in equation (3) from
column (1) to (2); spline polynomial approximation with 2nd-order or 3rd-order polynomial,
as in equation (5). The optimal bandwidth h is estimated either following Imbens and
Kalayanaraman (2012)-IK-in the first column, or implementing the algorithm presented
by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2013a, 2013b)-CTT-in the second column. Robust
standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses. Significance at the
10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table A.7: The Effect of the Majoritarian System, Difference-in-Discontinuities Estimates
Controlling for Heterogeneous Effect of the Introduction of the New Regime.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IK CCT poly 2rd poly 3rd
A. Dependent Variable: Re-election Probability of Mayor
Majoritarian System 0.2003*** 0.2714** 0.2181* 0.3449**
(0.076) (0.129) (0.114) (0.156)
h. 1,992 693 2,000 2,000
Observations 4,178 1,322 4,201 4,201
R-squared 0.0375 0.0522 0.0391 0.0406
F-test Population var. p-value 0.162 0.0678
B. Dependent Variable: Re-election Probability of Councilor
Majoritarian System 0.0010 0.0025 -0.0127 -0.0087
(0.032) (0.035) (0.032) (0.040)
h. 898 705 2,000 2,000
Observations 30,112 23,517 72,863 72,863
R-squared 0.0247 0.0235 0.0233 0.0235
F-test Population var. p-value 0.908 0.911
C. Dependent Variable: Re-election Probability of Assessors
Majoritarian System 0.0112 0.0259 -0.0126 0.0292
(0.036) (0.054) (0.049) (0.064)
h. 1,751 756 2,000 2,000
Observations 15,999 6,612 19,127 19,127
R-squared 0.0067 0.0081 0.0069 0.0071
F-test Population var. p-value 0.468 0.419
Note. Municipalities between 3,000 and 7,000 thousand inhabitants. Dependent variable:
Panel A The probability of being re-elected for a mayor. Panel B The probability of being
re-elected for a councilor. Panel C The probability of being re-elected for an assessor.
Difference-in-discontinuities design to estimate the causal effect of the plurality system with
panachage. Estimation methods: Local linear probability model as in equation (4) from
column (1) to (2); spline polynomial approximation with 2nd-order or 3rd-order polynomial,
as in equation (6). The optimal bandwidth h is estimated either following Imbens and
Kalayanaraman (2012)-IK-in the first column, or implementing the algorithm presented
by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2013a, 2013b)-CTT-in the second column. Robust
standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses. Significance at the
10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table A.8: The Effect of the Majoritarian System, Difference-in-Discontinuities Estimates
City and Year Fixed Effects & Time Invariant Geographical Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IK CCT poly 2rd poly 3rd
A. Dependent Variable: Re-election Probability of Mayor
Majoritarian System 0.2129*** 0.2594* 0.2019* 0.3513**
(0.078) (0.133) (0.116) (0.156)
City Fixed Effects
√ √ √ √
Year Fixed Effects
√ √ √ √
h. 1,992 693 2,000 2,000
Observations 4,178 1,322 4,201 4,201
R-squared 0.0660 0.1011 0.0684 0.0696
B. Dependent Variable: Re-election Probability of Mayor
Majoritarian System 0.2075*** 0.2689** 0.2071* 0.3401**
(0.076) (0.126) (0.114) (0.156)
Time Invariant Geographical Characteris-
tics
√ √ √ √
h. 1,992 693 2,000 2,000
Observations 4,178 1,322 4,201 4,201
R-squared 0.0499 0.0637 0.0514 0.0534
Note. Municipalities between 3,000 and 7,000 thousand inhabitants. Dependent variable: Panel A
The probability of being re-elected for a mayor. Panel B The probability of being re-elected for a
mayor. Difference-in-discontinuities design to estimate the causal effect of the plurality system with
panachage. Estimation methods: Local linear probability model as in equation (3) from column (1)
to (2); spline polynomial approximation with 2nd-order or 3rd-order polynomial, as in equation (5).
The optimal bandwidth h is estimated either following Imbens and Kalayanaraman (2012)-IK-in the
first column, or implementing the algorithm presented by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2013a,
2013b)-CTT-in the second column. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are
in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the
1% level by ***.
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Table A.9: The Effect of the Majoritarian System, Difference-in-Discontinuities Estimates
Probability of Having a Library between 1980 & 1993
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IK CCT poly 2rd poly 3rd
A. Dependent Variable: Probability of Having a Library
Majoritarian System 0.1623** 0.2307** 0.1131 0.2056**
(0.080) (0.105) (0.075) (0.097)
h. 826 465 2,000 2,000
Observations 1,546 879 4,201 4,201
R-squared 0.1658 0.1844 0.1328 0.1341
F-test Population var. p-value 0.989 0.618
B. Dependent Variable: Probability of Having a Library
Majoritarian System 0.1590* 0.2413** 0.1021 0.2138**
(0.081) (0.107) (0.076) (0.099)
Controlling for H.E.
√ √ √ √
h. 826 465 2,000 2,000
Observations 1,546 879 4,201 4,201
R-squared 0.1659 0.1849 0.1331 0.1345
F-test Population var. p-value 0.989 0.519
C. Dependent Variable: Probability of Having a Library
Majoritarian System 0.1607** 0.2693** 0.2049** 0.3128**
(0.080) (0.119) (0.103) (0.134)
Constant 0.0158 0.0097 0.0128 0.0167
(0.011) (0.017) (0.015) (0.020)
h. 819 345 1,000 1,000
Observations 1,543 698 1,965 1,965
R-squared 0.1660 0.1842 0.1578 0.1596
F-test Population var. p-value 0.172 0.953
D. Dependent Variable: Probability of Having a Library
Majoritarian System 0.1574* 0.2889** 0.2117** 0.3388**
(0.081) (0.122) (0.105) (0.138)
Controlling for H.E.
√ √ √ √
h. 819 345 1,000 1,000
Observations 1,543 698 1,965 1,965
R-squared 0.1661 0.1856 0.1580 0.1600
F-test Population var. p-value 0.405 0.369
Note. Municipalities between 3,000 and 7,000 thousand inhabitants. Dependent variable: Panel A, B,
C & Probability of Having a Library. Difference-in-discontinuities design to estimate the causal effect of
the plurality system with panachage. Estimation methods: Local linear probability model as in equation
(4) from column (1) to (2); spline polynomial approximation with 2nd-order or 3rd-order polynomial, as in
equation (6). The optimal bandwidth h is estimated either following Imbens and Kalayanaraman (2012)-IK-
in the first column, or implementing the algorithm presented by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2013a,
2013b)-CTT-in the second column. In panel A and B the optimal bandwidth h is calculated from a sample
that includes h = 2, 000, in panel C and D from a sample that includes h = 1, 000. Robust standard errors
clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at
the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table A.10: The Effect of the Majoritarian System, Difference-in-Discontinuities Estimates
Reshuﬄing of Positions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IK CCT poly 2rd poly 3rd
A. Dependent Variable: The Probability of Having a Reshuﬄing Higher than 1/3
Majoritarian System 0.0682 0.0811 0.0354 0.1480
(0.062) (0.071) (0.069) (0.091)
Controlling for H.E.
√ √ √ √
h. 1,122 833 2,000 2,000
Observations 2,209 1,568 4,201 4,201
R-squared 0.6160 0.6127 0.5963 0.5968
B. Dependent Variable: The Probability of Having a Reshuﬄing Higher than 2/5
Majoritarian System -0.1096*** -0.1689*** -0.1220*** -0.1925***
(0.039) (0.053) (0.046) (0.060)
Controlling for H.E.
√ √ √ √
h. 1,318 618 2,000 2,000
Observations 2,561 1,156 4,201 4,201
R-squared 0.0254 0.0390 0.0201 0.0228
C. Dependent Variable: The Probability of Having a Reshuﬄing Higher than 1/2
Majoritarian System -0.1163** -0.1789** -0.1672** -0.2022**
(0.047) (0.072) (0.068) (0.091)
Controlling for H.E.
√ √ √ √
h. 1,989 803 2,000 2,000
Observations 4,175 1,512 4,201 4,201
R-squared 0.0695 0.0819 0.0703 0.0715
D. Dependent Variable: The Probability of Having a Reshuﬄing Higher than 3/5
Majoritarian System -0.1154*** -0.1742*** -0.1254** -0.1863***
(0.043) (0.060) (0.051) (0.067)
Controlling for H.E.
√ √ √ √
h. 1,318 618 2,000 2,000
Observations 2,561 1,156 4,201 4,201
R-squared 0.0332 0.0468 0.0316 0.0347
Note. Municipalities between 3,000 and 7,000 thousand inhabitants. Dependent variable: Panel A The
probability of having a reshuﬄing higher than 1
3
. Panel B The probability of having a reshuﬄing higher
than 2
5
. Panel C The probability of having a reshuﬄing higher than 1
2
. Panel D The probability of having
a reshuﬄing higher than 3
5
. Difference-in-discontinuities design to estimate the causal effect of the plurality
system with panachage. Estimation methods: Local linear probability model as in equation (4) from column
(1) to (3); spline polynomial approximation with 2nd-order or 3rd-order polynomial, as in equation (6).
The optimal bandwidth h is estimated either following Imbens and Kalayanaraman (2012)- IK-in the first
column, or implementing the algorithm presented by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2013a, 2013b)-CTT-
in the second column. In panel A and B the optimal bandwidth h is calculated from a sample that includes
h = 2, 000, in panel C and D from a sample that includes h = 1, 000. Robust standard errors clustered at
the municipality level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level
by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table A.11: The Effect of the Majoritarian System, Difference-in-Discontinuities Estimates
Share of Votes of the First Party at the Parliamentary Elections of 1992 & Daily Newspaper
Circulation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IK CCT poly 2rd poly 3rd
A. Dependent Variable: Re-election Probability of Mayor
Share of Votes of the First Party Above Median
Majoritarian System 0.2845** 0.4221* 0.3662* 0.5452**
(0.135) (0.227) (0.197) (0.268)
Observations 2,081 616 2,092 2,092
Share of Votes of the First Party Below Median
Majoritarian System 0.1389 0.1258 0.0568 0.1784
(0.137) (0.236) (0.205) (0.273)
Observations 2,097 706 2,109 2,109
Difference Between
the Two Subsamples 0.1456 0.2963 0.3094 0.3668
(0.191) (0.319) (0.283) (0.383)
Wald test p-value 0.442 0.397 0.282 0.371
B. Dependent Variable: Re-election Probability of Mayor
Daily Newspaper Circulation Above Median
Majoritarian System 0.1786 0.3473* 0.2699* 0.4227*
(0.110) (0.181) (0.162) (0.221)
Observations 1,905 684 2,145 2,145
Daily Newspaper Circulation Below Median
Majoritarian System 0.1723 0.1605 0.1796 0.1913
(0.113) (0.179) (0.159) (0.213)
Observations 1,785 644 2,059 2,059
Difference Between
the Two Subsamples 0.0063 0.1868 0.0903 0.2314
(0.158) (0.254) (0.226) (0.307)
Wald test p-value 0.968 0.463 0.690 0.451
Note. Municipalities between 3,000 and 7,000 thousand inhabitants. Dependent variable: Panel A
& B The probability of being re-elected for a mayor. Panel A Difference-in-discontinuities design
to estimate the causal effect of the plurality system with panachage in different subsamples (that
is, above vs. below median share of vote of the first party at the parliamentary elections of 1992).
Panel B Difference-in-discontinuities design to estimate the causal effect of the plurality system with
panachage in different subsamples (that is, above vs. below median Daily Newspaper Circulation).
Estimation methods: Local linear probability model as in equation (3) from column (1) to (2);
spline polynomial approximation with 2nd-order or 3rd-order polynomial, as in equation (5). The
optimal bandwidth h is estimated either following Imbens and Kalayanaraman (2012)-IK-in the
first column, or implementing the algorithm presented by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2013a,
2013b)-CTT-in the second column. The Wald test p-value evaluates whether the estimates are
statistically different in the two subsample. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality
level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and
at the 1% level by ***.
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Table A.12: The Effect of the Majoritarian System, Difference-in-Discontinuities Estimates
Characteristics of The Elected Mayor
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IK CCT poly 2rd poly 3rd
A. Dependent Variable: Schooling of the Mayor
Majoritarian System -0.4888 -0.4815 -0.6269 -0.3762
(0.561) (0.749) (0.686) (0.899)
h. 1,422 747 2,000 2,000
Observations 2,779 1,403 4,186 4,186
R-squared 0.0128 0.0153 0.0110 0.0117
F-test Population var. p-value 0.949 0.787
B. Dependent Variable: The Probability of Elect a Male Mayor
Majoritarian System 0.0824 0.0860 0.1057* 0.1026
(0.053) (0.062) (0.057) (0.071)
h. 1,021 738 2,000 2,000
Observations 2,011 1,390 4,201 4,201
R-squared 0.0098 0.0060 0.0070 0.0088
F-test Population var. p-value 0.487 0.723
C. Dependent Variable: Age of the Mayor
Majoritarian System 0.0106 -1.8192 -0.2404 -0.5157
(1.556) (2.250) (1.745) (2.271)
h. 1,100 556 2,000 2,000
Observations 2,179 1,027 4,200 4,200
R-squared 0.0410 0.0672 0.0335 0.0348
F-test Population var. p-value 0.692 0.515
Note. Municipalities between 3,000 and 7,000 thousand inhabitants. Dependent variable: Panel A:
Schooling of the mayors; Panel B: The probability of elect a male mayor; Panel C: Age of the mayors.
Difference-in-discontinuities design to estimate the causal effect of the plurality system with panachage.
Estimation methods: Local linear probability model as in equation (3) from column (1) to (2); spline
polynomial approximation with 2nd-order or 3rd-order polynomial, as in equation (4). The optimal
bandwidth h is estimated either following Imbens and Kalayanaraman (2012)-IK-in the first column,
or implementing the algorithm presented by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2013a, 2013b)-CTT-
in the second column. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses.
Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table A.13: The Effect of the Majoritarian System, Difference-in-Discontinuities Estimates
Previous Job of the Elected Mayor
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IK CCT poly 2rd poly 3rd
A. Dependent Variable: The Probability of Elect a High Skilled Blue Collar
Majoritarian System -0.0114 0.0072 -0.0052 -0.0276
(0.027) (0.047) (0.035) (0.048)
h. 1,488 557 2,000 2,000
Observations 2,932 1,033 4,204 4,204
R-squared 0.0093 0.0232 0.0077 0.0087
F-test Population var. p-value 0.132 0.277
B. Dependent Variable: The Probability of Elect a High Skilled White Collar
Majoritarian System -0.0487 -0.1128 -0.1457 -0.1342
(0.072) (0.117) (0.104) (0.140)
h. 1,948 725 2,000 2,000
Observations 4,003 1,368 4,204 4,204
R-squared 0.0031 0.0046 0.0042 0.0049
F-test Population var. p-value 0.111 0.100
C. Dependent Variable: The Probability of Elect a Low Skilled Blue Collar
Majoritarian System -0.0040 -0.0016 -0.0115 -0.0136
(0.024) (0.028) (0.024) (0.030)
h. 889 739 2,000 2,000
Observations 1,692 1,395 4,204 4,204
R-squared 0.0055 0.0084 0.0030 0.0057
F-test Population var. p-value 0.822 0.808
D. Dependent Variable: The Probability of Elect a Low Skilled White Collar
Majoritarian System 0.0577 0.1493 0.0668 0.1975
(0.079) (0.106) (0.090) (0.123)
h. 1,215 682 2,000 2,000
Observations 2,375 1,300 4,204 4,204
R-squared 0.0062 0.0080 0.0059 0.0100
F-test Population var. p-value 0.705 0.0116
Note. Municipalities between 3,000 and 7,000 thousand inhabitants. Dependent variable: Panel A: The
probability of elect a high skilled blue collar; Panel B: The probability of elect a high skilled white collar;
Panel C: The probability of elect a low skilled blue collar; Panel D: The probability of elect a low skilled
white collar. Difference-in-discontinuities design to estimate the causal effect of the plurality system with
panachage. Estimation methods: Local linear probability model as in equation (3) from column (1) to (2);
spline polynomial approximation with 2nd-order or 3rd-order polynomial, as in equation (4). The optimal
bandwidth h is estimated either following Imbens and Kalayanaraman (2012)-IK-in the first column, or
implementing the algorithm presented by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2013a, 2013b)-CTT-in the
second column. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses. Significance
at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Table A.14: The Effect of the Majoritarian System, Difference-in-Discontinuities Estimates
Duration of the Office Schooling of the city Council
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IK CCT poly 2rd poly 3rd
A. Dependent Variable: The probability of Early Dissolution
Majoritarian System -0.1507*** -0.1096 -0.1606** -0.0564
(0.051) (0.076) (0.071) (0.094)
h. 1,822 749 2,000 2,000
Observations 3,632 1,411 4,201 4,201
R-squared 0.0324 0.0311 0.0329 0.0338
F-test Population var. p-value 0.697 0.566
B. Dependent Variable: Duration of the Office
Majoritarian System 0.2169** 0.1570 0.2121* 0.0163
(0.096) (0.132) (0.128) (0.152)
h. 1,575 663 2,000 2,000
Observations 3,110 1,249 4,201 4,201
R-squared 0.1133 0.1289 0.1204 0.1211
F-test Population var. p-value 0.420 0.913
C. Dependent Variable: Average Schooling of the Council
Majoritarian System 0.0526 0.1829 0.0688 0.4396
(0.228) (0.266) (0.244) (0.302)
h. 1,036 706 2,000 2,000
Observations 1,999 1,307 4,123 4,123
R-squared 0.0746 0.0680 0.0984 0.1011
F-test Population var. p-value 0.390 0.0210
D. Dependent Variable: Average Schooling of the Cabinet of the Mayor
Majoritarian System 0.4503 0.7033 0.0652 0.7250
(0.390) (0.460) (0.398) (0.529)
h. 935 645 2,000 2,000
Observations 1,776 1,183 4,124 4,124
R-squared 0.0594 0.0728 0.0652 0.0668
F-test Population var. p-value 0.869 0.286
Note. Municipalities between 3,000 and 7,000 thousand inhabitants. Dependent variable: Panel A:
The probability of early dissolution of the office; Panel B: Average duration of the office in years;
Panel C: Average schooling of the councillors; Panel D: Average schooling of the assessors; Panel E:
Average schooling of the mayors; Panel F: Average age of the mayors; Panel G: Fraction of male
mayors. Difference-in-discontinuities design to estimate the causal effect of the plurality system with
panachage. Estimation methods: Local linear probability model as in equation (3) from column (1)
to (2); spline polynomial approximation with 2nd-order or 3rd-order polynomial, as in equation (4).
The optimal bandwidth h is estimated either following Imbens and Kalayanaraman (2012)-IK-in the
first column, or implementing the algorithm presented by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2013a,
2013b)-CTT-in the second column. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in
parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1%
level by ***.
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Table A.15: The Effect of the Introduction of the New Regime
A. City below 5,000 inhabitants
Dependent Variable: Re-election Probability of Mayor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average Effect of the Reform 0.0438*** 0.0400***
(0.009) (0.009)
1st Election After Reform -0.0206* -0.0221** -0.0225** -0.0394***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
2nd Election After Reform 0.1305*** 0.1153*** 0.1281*** 0.0998***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Male 0.1332*** 0.1130***
(0.018) (0.026)
Years of Schooling -0.0069*** 0.0016
(0.001) (0.002)
Age 0.0091*** 0.0165***
(0.000) (0.001)
Constant 0.4646*** 0.4646*** 0.0152 0.4672*** 0.4667*** -0.4092***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.033) (0.007) (0.007) (0.054)
City Fixed Effects × × × √ √ √
Observations 13,287 13,287 13,287 13,287 13,287 13,287
R-squared 0.0016 0.0134 0.0602 0.0020 0.0196 0.0879
Number of Cities 4,651 4,651 4,651 4,651 4,651 4,651
B. City between 5,000 and 15,000 inhabitants
A. Dependent Variable: Re-election Probability of Mayor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average Effect of the Reform 0.1637*** 0.1845***
(0.017) (0.018)
1st Election After Reform 0.0599*** 0.0672*** 0.0828*** 0.0684***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
2nd Election After Reform 0.2118*** 0.2062*** 0.2113*** 0.1922***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
Male 0.1130*** 0.1495***
(0.028) (0.042)
Years of Schooling -0.0158*** -0.0096***
(0.002) (0.004)
Age 0.0037*** 0.0108***
(0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.2606*** 0.2606*** 0.2195*** 0.2461*** 0.2447*** -0.2222**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.057) (0.013) (0.013) (0.088)
City Fixed Effects × × × √ √ √
Observations 3,353 3,353 3,353 3,353 3,353 3,353
R-squared 0.0241 0.0575 0.0818 0.0424 0.0915 0.1275
Number of Cities 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200 1,200
Note. Panel A Municipalities below 5,000 thousand inhabitants. Panel B Municipalities between 5,000 and
15,000 thousand inhabitants. Dependent variable: Panel A The probability of being re-elected for a mayor. Panel
B The probability of being re-elected for a mayor. Pre/Post strategy to estimate the effect of the introduction
of the new electoral system. Estimation methods: Linear probability model as in equation (1) in column (1) and
(4). Linear probability model as from the equation (2) in column (2), (3), (5) and (6). The variable Average
Effect of the Reform identifies the average effect of the introduction od the new reform. The variable 1st Election
After Reform identifies the difference between the period before the reform and the fist election after the reform.
The variable 2nd Election After Reform identifies the difference between first election after the reform and the
second election after the reform. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses.
Significance at the 10 % level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***.
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Figure A.6: Distribution of Election by Year
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Note. Municipalities below 5,000 thousand inhabitants. Fig. (a) The number of cities below 5,000
inhabitants that go for election in every year. Fig. b The number of cities between 5,000 and 15,000
inhabitants that go for election in every year.
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Figure A.7: Difference-in-Discontinuities for Several Variables
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Note. Municipalities between 3,000 and 7,000 thousand inhabitants. Vertical axis: difference
between the value of each variable pre-reform (i.e before 1993) and the value of each variable
post-reform (i.e after 1993). Horizontal axis (for all graphs): 1991 census population size minus
5,000. The variables used are: 1. Average duration of the office in years. 2. Probability of early
dissolution of the office. 3. Average schooling of the councillors. 4. Average schooling of the
assessors. 5. Schooling of the mayor. 6. Age of the mayor. 7. The probability of elect a male
mayor. 8. The probability of elect a high skilled blue collar. 9. The probability of elect a high
skilled white collar. 10. The probability of elect a low skilled blue collar. 11. The probability of
elect a low skilled white collar. The central line is a spline 3rd-order polynomial fit; the latter
lines represent the 95% confidence interval. Scatter points are averaged over intervals of 50
inhabitants.
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Table A.16: Falsification Test After 1993
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IK CCT poly 2rd poly 3rd
A. Dependent Variable: Re-election Probability of Mayor
False Majoritarian System -0.1393 -0.1378 -0.1547 -0.1223
(0.085) (0.130) (0.108) (0.139)
h. 1,562 607 2,000 2,000
Observations 2,111 767 2,893 2,893
R-squared 0.0304 0.0491 0.0344 0.0362
B. Dependent Variable: Re-election Probability of Councilor
Majoritarian System 0.0210 0.0429 0.0036 0.0257
(0.028) (0.035) (0.028) (0.036)
h. 869 577 2,000 2,000
Observations 18,148 11,605 45,992 45,992
R-squared 0.0128 0.0147 0.0121 0.0124
C. Dependent Variable: Re-election Probability of Assessors
False Majoritarian System 0.0509 0.0103 0.0482 0.0308
h. 1,156 467 2,000 2,000
Observations 5,493 2,167 10,152 10,152
R-squared 0.0103 0.0165 0.0113 0.0115
D. Dependent Variable: Probability of Having a Library
False Majoritarian System 0.0074 0.0217 -0.0217 0.0164
(0.018) (0.031) (0.027) (0.034)
h. 1,982 550 2,000 2,000
Observations 2,848 695 2,893 2,893
R-squared 0.0026 0.0044 0.0041 0.0052
Note. Municipalities between 3,000 and 7,000 thousand inhabitants, only between 1993 and
2000. Dependent variable: Panel A The probability of being re-elected for a mayor. Panel B
The probability of being re-elected for a councilor. Panel C The probability of being re-elected
for an assessor. Panel D Probability of Having a Library. Difference-in-discontinuities design
to estimate the (false) causal effect of the plurality system after 1993 (when both groups of
city below and above 5,000 inhabitants have the same plurality system). Estimation methods:
Local linear probability model from column (1) to (2); spline polynomial approximation with
2nd-order or 3rd-order polynomial. The optimal bandwidth h is estimated either following
Imbens and Kalayanaraman (2012)-IK-in the first column, or implementing the algorithm
presented by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2013a, 2013b)-CTT-in the second column.
Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses. Significance at
the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***
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Table A.17: Test at Other Thresholds (3,000 10,000).
Interaction Between the Electoral Law and the Wage of the Mayor
A. Dependent Variable: Re-election Probability of Mayor
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IK CCT poly 2rd poly 3rd
A1. Test at 3,000
Lower Wage of the Mayor Before 1993 -0.0051 -0.0268 0.0093 0.0007
(0.055) (0.085) (0.082) (0.109)
h. 2,000 855 2,000 2,000
Observations 8,959 3,337 8,959 8,959
R-squared 0.0218 0.0307 0.0225 0.0231
F-test Population var. p-value 0.0844 0.100
A2. Test at 10,000
Lower Wage of the Mayor Before 1993 -0.0084 -0.2752 -0.1438 -0.3116
(0.164) (0.232) (0.206) (0.270)
h. 1,446 757 2,000 2,000
Observations 785 386 1,087 1,087
R-squared 0.0693 0.0747 0.0630 0.0655
F-test Population var. p-value 0.217 0.192
B. Dependent Variable: Probability of Having a Library
B1. Test at 3,000
Lower Wage of the Mayor Before 1993 0.0490 0.0181 -0.0185 0.0099
(0.035) (0.054) (0.051) (0.068)
h. 1,997 815 2,000 2,000
Observations 8,941 3,164 8,959 8,959
R-squared 0.1176 0.1215 0.1181 0.1185
F-test Population var. p-value 0.592 0.320
B2. Test at 10,000
Lower Wage of the Mayor Before 1993 -0.0748 -0.0949 -0.2793* -0.2298
(0.096) (0.169) (0.157) (0.220)
h. 1977 773 2,000 2,000
Observations 1,072 395 1,088 1,088
R-squared 0.0866 0.1144 0.0996 0.1019
F-test Population var. p-value 0.462 0.733
Note. Municipalities between 1,000 and 5,000 thousand inhabitants in panel A and between 8,000 and 12,000
in panel B. Dependent variable: Panel A & B The probability of being re-elected for a mayor.Difference-in-
discontinuities design to estimate the causal effect of the interaction between the electoral law and the wage
of the mayor (at 3,000 and 10,000 inhabitants the two groups of city below and above the threshold have
the same electoral system before and after the reform but different wage. If there is interaction between
wage and electoral system the two groups of city should react in a different way to the introduction to the
same electoral system). Estimation methods: Local linear probability model from column (1) to (2); spline
polynomial approximation with 2nd-order or 3rd-order polynomial. The optimal bandwidth h is estimated
either following Imbens and Kalayanaraman (2012)-IK-in the first column, or implementing the algorithm
presented by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2013a, 2013b)-CTT-in the second column. Robust standard
errors clustered at the municipality level are in parentheses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *,
at the 5% level by **, and at the 1% level by ***
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Table A.18: Balance Tests of Time-Invariant Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IK CCT poly 2rd poly 3rd
Area Size -1.9054 -2.7382 -3.3923 -3.2876
(1.610) (2.155) (2.266) (2.532)
Observations 3,748 1,356 4,207 4,207
Capital Altitude -5.2904 -7.3320 -9.8102 -5.6691
(10.416) (12.232) (11.906) (15.664)
Observations 2,854 1,453 4,207 4,207
River 0.0017 -0.0019 -0.0061 0.0219
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022)
Observations 2,294 1,416 4,207 4,207
Sea Distance 858.4592 2,378.5121 2,945.9318 -453.8499
(3,250.099) (3,546.279) (3,306.945) (3,815.525)
Observations 1,921 1,203 4,207 4,207
Seismicity Class 0.0102 0.0239 -0.0008 -0.0075
(0.072) (0.073) (0.066) (0.084)
Observations 1,718 1,532 4,207 4,207
Urbanization -0.0484 -0.0414 -0.0398 -0.0349
(0.034) (0.039) (0.036) (0.047)
Observations 2,153 1,359 4,207 4,207
Average Grid -8.2036 -1.9913 -5.5633 -3.0669
(10.497) (11.833) (11.052) (13.616)
Observations 1,751 1,096 4,207 4,207
Note. Municipalities between 3,000 and 7,000 thousand inhabitants. Difference-in-
discontinuities design for time-Invariant characteristics. Estimation methods: Local lin-
ear probability model from column (1) to (2); spline polynomial approximation with
2nd-order or 3rd-order polynomial. The optimal bandwidth h is estimated either fol-
lowing Imbens and Kalayanaraman (2012)-IK-in the first column, or implementing the
algorithm presented by Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2013a, 2013b)-CTT-in the
second column. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipality level are in paren-
theses. Significance at the 10% level is represented by *, at the 5% level by **, and at
the 1% level by ***
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Figure A.8: Placebo test for Re-elected
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Note. Placebo tests based on permutation methods for the probability of re-election. Top
graph (left): the probability of re-election of mayor; Top graph (right): the probability of of
having a library; Bottom graph (left): the probability of re-election for councillors ; Bottom
graph (right): the probability of re-election for assessors. The figures reports the empirical c.d.f.
of normalized point estimates from a set of diff-in-disc estimations at 500 false thresholds below
and 500 false thresholds above the true thresholds at 5,000 (namely any point from 4,990 to 4,000
and any point from 5,010 to 5,600). Estimation methods: spline polynomial approximation with
3rd-order polynomial. The vertical line indicates our benchmark estimate for deficit from Table
A.6 (i.e. true coefficient normalized to 100) and its negative value.
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Figure A.9: Two Thousand Regression for Mayors Re-elected, Difference-in-Discontinuities
Estimates
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Note. Difference-in-discontinuities estimate with all the possible bandwidth. Vertical axis:
Central line are coefficients of difference-in-discontinuities estimate, the latter lines represent
the 90% confidence interval. Horizontal axis: at 0 the bandwidth used to estimate the coef-
ficient of the difference-in-discontinuities estimate is h = 2, 000 and. At 1990 the bandwidth
used is h = 10. Top graph: Coefficients of local linear probability model according to equa-
tion (4).Bottom graph (left): Coefficients of spline polynomial approximation with 2nd-order
according to equation (6). Bottom graph (right): Coefficients of spline polynomial approxi-
mation with 3rd-order according to equation (6).
Appendix B
Separated Under the Same Roof
B.1 The model
Proof of proposition (2.2.2)
The derivative of b with respect to N is the following: 4k(4N
3+3N2)
4
√
w2+4kN3(N+1)
, which is positive.
The derivative of b with respect to k is the following: 4N
3(N+1)
4
√
w2+4kN3(N+1)
, which is positive.
The derivatives of T with respect N, k are zero if T has a corner solution. Otherwise, the
derivative of T with respect to N is negative, because N enters at the denominator in T ,
and in the numerator with a negative sign. Moreover T depends negatively on b, which is
an increasing function of N . The derivative of T with respect to k is negative, because T
depends negatively on b, which is an increasing function of N . The public spending T + b
decreases with N if k = 0, because N enters only the denominator. The derivative of public
spending with respect to N is the following:
4kN4 + 10kN3 + 6kN2 − w2 − w√w2 + 4kN3(N + 1)
2(N + 1)2
√
w2 + 4kN3(N + 1)
. (B.1)
If k goes to infinity the derivative goes to infinity, while if k is equal to 0 the derivative is
negative. Moreover, the derivative of expression (B.1) with respect to k is positive because
expression (B.1) can be rewritten as follows:
4N4 + 10N3 + 6N2
2(N + 1)2
√
w2/k2 + 4N3(N + 1)/k
− w
2
2(N + 1)2
√
w2 + 4kN3(N + 1)
− w
2(N + 1)2
. (B.2)
The first and second addenda depend positively on k, while the third addendum does not
depend on k. The derivative of T+b with respect to N is an increasing function of k. Hence,
for the intermediate value theorem, there must be a k¯ such that, if k < k¯ the derivative
of public spending with respect to N is negative, while if k > k¯, the derivative is positive.
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The derivative of T + b with respect to k is the following: 4N
3(N+1)
4(N+1)
√
w2+4kN3(N+1)
, which is
positive. Proof of proposition (2.2.2)
The derivative of T with respect to p in expression (2.12) is (N−1)N
(N+1−P+NP )2 , which is positive.
Public spending are equal to total taxation, because there is no debt. If p = 1, the total
revenues are equal to w/2, which is the welfare maximizing revenues. Proof of proposition
(2.2.2)
The cross derivative of T with respecto to N and p is (1−p)(2N−1)+N(1+p)
(N+1−p+Np)3 , which is positive.
Let me solve problem (2.1) with CRRA utility functions and a general convex cost
function, u1(·) = u2(·) = 11−γ (·)1−γ, γ ∈ R+, γ > 1, c(·), c˙ > 0, c¨ > 0. The first order
conditions are the following:
−
(w
N
− ti
)−γ
+
1
N
(
1
N
T + bi
)−γ
= 0, (B.3)
(
1
N
T + bi
)−γ
− 1
kN
c˙
(
b
N
)
= 0. (B.4)
Equation (B.3) can be rewritten as follows:
N
1
γ
(
1
N
T + bi
)
=
1
N
− ti, (B.5)
I sum the left hand side and right hand side of the last equation, for every i ∈ S, and solve
for T :
T = max
{
w −N 1γ b
N
1
γ + 1
, 0
}
. (B.6)
Equation (B.4) can be rewritten as follows, substituting T = w−N
1
γ b
N
1
γ +1
:
w −N 1γ b
N
1
γ + 1
+ biN = N(kN)
1
γ
[
c˙
(
b
N
)]− 1
γ
. (B.7)
I sum the left hand side and right hand side of the last equation, for every i ∈ S:
w + b = k
1
γ
(
N
2+γ
γ +N
1+γ
γ
)[
c˙
(
b
N
)]−1
γ
. (B.8)
Notice that T is positive only if w − N 1γ b is positive, otherwise there is a corner solution
and T is equal to 0.
Proof of proposition (2.2.2) for the case u1(·) = u2(·) = 11−γ (·)1−γ, γ ∈ R+, γ > 1, c(·),
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c˙ > 0, c¨ > 0
The derivative of b with respect to N is given by the following expression:
∂b
∂N
= k
1
γ
(
2+γ
γ
N
2
γ + 1+γ
γ
N
1
γ
) [
c˙
(
b
N
)]−1
γ + 1
γ
(
N
2+γ
γ +N
1+γ
γ
) [
c˙
(
b
N
)]− 1+γ
γ c¨
(
b
N
)
b
N2
1 + 1
γ
k
1
γ
(
N
2+γ
γ +N
1+γ
γ
) [
c˙
(
b
N
)]− 1+γ
γ c¨
(
b
N
)
1
N
. (B.9)
This expression is positive. The derivative of b with respect to k is given by the following
expression:
∂b
∂k
=
1
γ
k
1−γ
γ
(
N
2+γ
γ +N
1+γ
γ
) [
c˙
(
b
N
)]−1
γ
1 + 1
γ
k
1
γ
(
N
2+γ
γ +N
1+γ
γ
) [
c˙
(
b
N
)]− 1+γ
γ c¨
(
b
N
)
1
N
(B.10)
This expression is positive. The derivate of T with respect to N, k is zero if T has a
corner solution. Otherwise, the derivative of T with respect to N is given by the following
expression:
∂T
∂N
= −
(
N
1
γ + 1
) [
1
γ
N
1−γ
γ b+N
1
γ ∂b
∂N
]
+ 1
γ
(
w −N 1γ b
)
N
1−γ
γ(
N
1
γ + 1
)2 . (B.11)
Th derivative ∂b
∂N
is positive. Moreover, expression w−N 1γ b is positive if there is no corner
solution, hence the derivative of T with respect N is negative. The derivative of T with
respect to k is given by − N
1
γ
N
1
γ +1
∂b
∂k
, hence it is negative. The total spending T + b can be
rewritten as follows:
T + b =
w + b
N
1
γ + 1
. (B.12)
This expression depends on k only through b. If k = 0, the first order condition (B.4) is
negative, hence b has a corner solution in 0. Therefore the derivative of T + b with respect
to N is negative. If k →∞, the first order condition (B.4) is positive, consequently b→∞,
which means that T has a corner solution in 0, hence the derivative of T + b with respect
to N is equal to the derivative of b with respect to N , which is positive. In order to prove
that there is a unique value k¯ such that, if k < k¯, the derivative of T + b with respect to
N is negative, and above which the derivative of T + b with respect to N is positive, we
would need to prove that ∂
2
∂k∂N
(T + b) > 0. We are not able to assess the sign of this cross
derivative, because of computational difficulty. By the mean value theorem we can still
assess that there are thresholds k¯1, and k¯2, with k¯1 ≤ k¯2, such that, if k < k¯1, the derivative
of T + b with respect to N is negative, and if k > k¯2 the derivative of T + b with respect to
N is positive.
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Let me solve problem (2.10) with CRRA utility functions. The first order condition is
the following:
− (w − T )−γ + 1− p
N
T−γ + pT−γ = 0. (B.13)
In this equation we substituted ti = T/N , considering that the first order conditions are the
same for all groups, hence the solution ti is identical. Moreover, we multiplied the left hand
side and right hand side by N−γ.
Proof of proposition (2.2.2) with CRRA utility functions
Using the implicit function theorem I compute the derivative of T , as determined by equation
(B.13), with respect to p:
∂T
∂p
=
1
γ
−T−γ
N
+ T−γ
1−p
N
T−γ−1 + pT−γ−1 + (w − T )−γ−1 . (B.14)
The derivative is positive because −T−γ
N
+ T−γ > 0. If p = 1, equation (B.13) results in the
following expression:
(ti)
−γ =
(
1
N
w − ti
)−γ
. (B.15)
Applying degree −1/γ to both sides of the equation, and summing the left hand side and
right hand side, for every i ∈ S I obtain the following result: T = w/2.
The first order condition on ti for the welfare maximizer problem is the following:
−
(
1
N
w − ti
)−γ
+
N
N
(
T
N
)−γ
= 0, (B.16)
which delivers T = w/2. The welfare maximizer internalizes the effect of an increase in ti
on the level of public goods gj, j 6= i. Proof of proposition (2.2.2) with CRRA utility
functions
???
Let us consider the case in which groups have different sizes in the municipality, in
particular group i has size si, she holds siw of the wealth of the municipality,
∑N
j=1 sj = 1.
The groups cannot finance the public goods through debt. I assume that the bargaining
on the share of revenues T that is devoted to finance the group specific public good gi
delivers the following result: gi = fi(s1, ..., sN)T , where
∑N
j=1 fj(s1, ..., sN) = 1, and
∂fi
∂si
> 0,
∂fi
∂sj
< 0, j 6= i.1 An example of f := (f1, ..., fN), that satisfies the previous conditions is
1Let us assume that if si increases all other shares decrease with the same margin:
∂sj
∂si
= 1N−1 .
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f = (s1, ..., sN), or f = (s
2
1, ..., s
2
N) /
∑N
j=1 s
2
j .
The problem party i faces can be represented as follows:
max
ti
u1 (siw − ti) + u2 (fiT ) . (B.17)
Let me consider solve this problem with CRRA utility functions and a general convex cost
function.
The first order condition is the following:
− (siw − ti)−γ + fi (fiT )−γ = 0. (B.18)
This equation can be rewritten as follows:
f 1−γi T
−γ = (siw − ti)−γ . (B.19)
I apply degree −1/γ to both sides of the last equation, and I sum the left hand side and
right hand side, for every i ∈ S:
∑
j
f
1− 1
γ
j T = w − T ⇒ T =
w
1 +
∑N
j=1 f
1− 1
γ
j
. (B.20)
The revenues T are equal to the public spending of the municipality, because public goods
cannot be financed through debt. If public goods cannot be financed through debt, the
public spending of the municipality is a decreasing function of the fractionalization of parties
in the municipality council. Proof
The index F :=
∑N
j=1 f
1− 1
γ
j is a quasi-concave function of the party share vector (s1, ..., sN).???
As discussed in Esteban and Ray (2008), from the quasi-concavity of this index derive the
properties of a fractionalization index.
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Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics
A. Election Characteristics
N mean sd min max
Fractionalization Index 932 0,71 0,21 0 1
Number of Parties 932 4,15 1,32 1 10
Turnout 932 75,92 6,13 55,52 90,98
Percentage of Votes Mayor 932 50,39 11,72 19,39 88,99
Runoff 932 0,55 0,50 0 1
Runoff Alliances 932 0,09 0,29 0 1
Runoff Alliances with Seats 932 0,05 0,22 0 1
Assessors Replaced 907 1,87 2,76 0 23
Second Term Mayor 932 0,29 0,45 0 1
Duration of the Office 706 4,66 0,86 1 5
Mayor Re-elected 706 0,28 0,45 0 1
Right-Wing Coalition 932 0,32 0,47 0 1
Left-Wing Coalition 932 0,65 0,48 0 1
Aligned 932 0,78 0,41 0 1
B. Geographical Characteristics
N mean sd min max
Municipal Area 932 88,33 104,37 1,62 1307,71
Degree of Urbanization 932 2,37 0,62 1 3
Seismicity 932 2,94 0,91 1 4
Sea Distance 932 54683,60 49211,70 655,98 206403,59
Population 932 46344,40 116200,93 9588 2724347
River 932 0,61 0,49 0 1
Altitude 932 4,09 1,12 1 5
Church Density 932 0,00070 0,00061 0,00002 0,00542
C. Mayors Characteristics
N mean sd min max
Age 932 49,85 8,75 27 74
Male Mayors 932 0,91 0,29 0 1
No High School 932 0,04 0,20 0 1
High School 932 0,29 0,46 0 1
At Least Bachelor 932 0,60 0,49 0 1
Low Blue C. 932 0 0,03 0 1
High Blue C. 932 0,01 0,08 0 1
Low White C. 932 0,26 0,44 0 1
High White C. 932 0,59 0,49 0 1
Others Job 932 0,08 0,27 0 1
Note. The sample includes cities with more than 15,000 inhabitants and refers to the period from 2002 to 2012. The
sample contains only mayors which have at least three running parties within the coalition. Panel A Fractionalization
Index is one minus the fractionalization index, as from equation (2.13). Number of Parties is the number of parties of
the ruling coalition. Turnout is the percentage of voter turnout. Percentage of Votes Mayor is the percentage of votes
obtained by the winning mayor. Runoff is one if the mayor is elected at the second round. Runoff Alliances is one
if the mayor as been endorsed by other parties between the two rounds. Runoff Alliances with Seats is one if parties
who endorse the mayor obtain seats within the city council. Assessors Replaced is the number of assessors replaced over
the total number of assessors. Second Term Mayor is one if the mayor is at his second term. Duration of the Office is
the number of years of the legislature. Mayor Re-elected is one if the mayor will be re-elected. Right-Wing Coalition
is one if the coalition of the mayor is right-wing. Left-Wing Coalition is one if the coalition of the mayor is left-wing.
Aligned is one if the coalition of the mayor is aligned with the central government. Panel B Municipal Area is the area
of the municipality in square kilometers. Degree of Urbanization takes a value from 1 to 5 according to the degree of
urbanization.Seismicity takes a value from 1 to 3 according to the degree of seismicity. Sea Distance is the distance from
the sea. Population is the resident population of the city. River is one if the municipality is crossed by a river. Altitude
is the altitude of the municipality in meters. Church Density is the number of church of the city over the population.
Panel C Age is the age of the mayor. Male Mayors is the sex of the mayor. No High School is one if the mayor does not
have the diploma. High School is one if the mayor has the diploma. At Least Bachelor is one if the mayor has at least
the bachelor. Low Blue Collar is one if the mayor was a low level blue collar. High Blue Collar is one if the mayor was
a high level blue collar. Low White Collar is one if the mayor was a low level white collar. High White Collar is one if
the mayor was a high level white collar. Others Job is one if the mayor was doing other jobs than the one of the previous
categories.
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Table B.2: Descriptive Statistics of Fiscal Outcomes
A. Municipal Budget
N mean sd min max
Total Expenditure 4076 1189.91 431.69 57.21 4643.93
Current Expenditure 4076 741.66 200.90 49.11 2558.37
Capital Expenditure 4076 234.36 216.65 0.81 2518.03
Total Revenues 3959 1183.03 436.36 63.14 5530.95
Local Taxes 3959 426.32 175.58 31.21 4641.61
Fees & Tariffs 3959 169.68 105.05 3.75 1217.38
New Debt 3959 190.90 131.82 0 2028.38
Central Transfers 3957 103.13 192.32 1 2637.05
Deficit 3957 83154.60 200000 1.01 600000
Note. The sample includes cities with more than 15,000 inhabitants and refers to the period
from 2002 to 2012. The sample contains only mayors which have at least three running parties
within the coalition. Total Expenditure is the total amount of expenditure of the municipality.
Current Expenditure is the portion of expenditure of the municipality that is used to fund ordinary
management of services.Capital Expenditure is the portion of expenditure of the municipality
which it is intended to finance public works and real estates that produce repeated benefits
over time. Total Revenues is the total amount of revenues of the municipality. Local Taxes
is the portion of revenues that comes from municipal taxes. Fees & Tariffs include revenues
from the supply of public services, from exercising certain functions and from the management
of certain activities or from ownership of properties. New Debt revenues from taking out loans
serving to finance investments. Central Transfers revenues that come from higher administrative
level, mainly from the State, the Province and the Region.Deficit is the differenze between Total
Expenditure and Total Revenues.
Figure B.1: Composition of Public Expenditure & Total Revenues
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Note. The sample includes cities with more than 15,000 inhabitants and refers to the period
from 2002 to 2012. The sample contains only mayors which have at least three running parties
within the coalition. Left graph. composition of total public expenditure: (Navy) Total
Expenditure; (Red) Current Expenditure; (Green) Capital Expenditure; (Orange) Other. Left
graph. composition of total revenues: (Navy) Total Revenues; (Red) Local Taxes; (Green) Fees
& Tariffs; (Orange) Central Transfers; (Blue) New Debt.
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B.2.1 IV Strategy
Figure B.2: The Italian Municipality Ballot Paper - Facsimile
Note. Facsimile ballot paper of municipalities with more than 15,000 inhabitants
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Figure B.3: Share of Votes of the Party by Position in the Ballot Paper
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Note. The sample includes cities with more than 15,000 inhabitants and refers to the period
from 2002 to 2012. The sample contains all the running mayors which have at least three running
parties within the coalition. Top graph (left): share of votes of parties by position in the ballot
- running mayors with a coalition of three parties. Top graph (right): share of votes of parties
by position in the ballot - running mayors with a coalition of four parties. Central graph
(left): share of votes of parties by position in the ballot - running mayors with a coalition of five
parties. Central graph (right): share of votes of parties by position in the ballot - running
mayors with a coalition of six parties. Botton graph (left): share of votes of parties by position
in the ballot - running mayors with a coalition of seven parties. Botton graph (right): share
of votes of parties by position in the ballot - running mayors with a coalition of eight parties.
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Figure B.4: Ranking of the Party at the Focal Point & The Share of Seats
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Note. The sample includes cities with more than 15,000 inhabitants and refers to the period from 2002
to 2012. The sample contains only parties that are at the focal point of the ballot within the coalition
of the mayors. Vertical axis: share of seats of the party at the focal point of the ballot. Horizontal axis:
the ranking position of the votes that the parties get at the elections among all the parties within the
coalition of the mayor.
Figure B.5: Ranking of the Party at the Focal Point & The Fractionalization Index
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Note. The sample includes cities with more than 15,000 inhabitants and refers to the period from 2002
to 2012. The sample contains only parties that are at the focal point of the ballot within the coalition of
the mayors. Vertical axis: s one minus the fractionalization index, as from equation (2.13). Horizontal
axis: the ranking position of the votes that the parties get at the elections among all the parties within
the coalition of the mayor. Top graph (left): The sample contains only coalition with three running
parties. Top graph (right): The sample contains only coalition with three running parties. Bottom
graph (left): The sample contains only coalition with seven running parties. Bottom graph (right):
The sample contains all the coalitions of the running mayors.
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Figure B.6: Placebo Test - The Effect of the Ranking of a Randomly Drawn Party of the
Coalition
on Fractionalization Index & Number of Parties
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Note. The sample includes cities with more than 15,000 inhabitants and refers to the
period from 2002 to 2012. The sample contains all the running parties within the coalition
of the running mayors which have at least three running parties. Vertical axis: coefficients
of ordinary least squares estimations as in equation (). This are coefficients as from
regression in table B.6, panel A and column (14) & (16). However, differently from the
former regression the it is not used the ranking of the median party, but the ranking of
a randomly draw party within the coalition. Left graph: the dependent variable is the
Fractionalization Index which is one minus the fractionalization index, as from equation
(2.13). Right graph: the dependent variable is the Number of Parties which is the
number of parties of the ruling coalition. Horizontal axis: the sequence of extraction of
random parties within the coalition.
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B.2.2 RDD Strategy
Figure B.7: Regression Discontinuity Design - Several Variables
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Note. The sample includes cities with more than 15,000 inhabitants and refers to the
period from 2002 to 2012. The sample contains only mayors which have at least three
running parties within the coalition. Vertical axis: the values of each variable. The
variables used are: 1. age of the elected mayor. 2. sex of the elected mayor. 3. previous
job of the elected mayor. 4. schooling of the elected mayor. 5. population of the
municipality. 6. the variable is a dummy that take values one if the municipality is
crossed by a river. 7 it is the discount of the municipality from the sea. 8 it is a dummy
that takes value one if the municipality is from south. 9. it is a dummy that take value
one if the municipality if from north. 10. it is the percentage of voter turnout. 11. It is
the number go running mayor in the municipality. 12 .it is the number of running parties
in the municipality. Horizontal axis: it is the normalized distance from the from the 50
percent threshold. In detail, is the percentage of the votes obtained by the mayor minus
50. On the right of the threshold there are the mayors that have win at the first round.
On the left of the threshold there are the mayors that have win at the second round. The
central line is a linear fit. Scatter points are averaged over intervals of 0.25 percentage
point.
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Figure B.8: Regression Discontinuity Design - Density of Running Mayors at the Threshold
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Distribution of Running Mayors
Note. The sample includes cities with more than 15,000 inhabitants and refers to the
period from 2002 to 2012. The sample contains all the running mayors which have at least
three running parties within the coalition. Test of the continuity at the threshold. Vertical
axis: density of running mayors. Horizontal axis: the percentage of votes obtained by the
running mayors.
Figure B.9: Regression Discontinuity Design - Fractionalization Index & Number of Parties
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Fractionalization Index
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Number of Parties
Note. The sample includes cities with more than 15,000 inhabitants and refers to the period
from 2002 to 2012. The sample contains only mayors which have at least three running parties
within the coalition. Vertical axis: the values of each variable. The variables used are: 1. it is
one minus the fractionalization index, as from equation (2.13). 2. it is the number of parties of
the ruling coalition. Horizontal axis: it is the normalized distance from the from the 50 percent
threshold. In detail, is the percentage of the votes obtained by the mayor minus 50. On the
right of the threshold there are the mayors that have win at the first round. On the left of the
threshold there are the mayors that have win at the second round. The central line is a linear
fit. Scatter points are averaged over intervals of 0.25 percentage point.
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Figure B.10: Composition of Public Expenditure & Total Revenues by Round of Election
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Note. The sample includes cities with more than 15,000 inhabitants and refers to the period
from 2002 to 2012. The sample contains only mayors which have at least three running parties
within the coalition. Left graph. composition of total public expenditure by round of election of
the Mayor: (Navy) Total Expenditure; (Red) Current Expenditure; (Green) Capital Expenditure;
(Orange) Other. Left graph. composition of total revenues by round of election of the Mayor:
(Navy) Total Revenues; (Red) Local Taxes; (Green) Fees & Tariffs; (Orange) Central Transfers;
(Blue) New Debt
100 Chapter B. Separated Under the Same Roof
Figure B.11: Regression Discontinuity Design - Fiscal Outcomes
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Deficit
Note. The sample includes cities with more than 15,000 inhabitants and refers to the period
from 2002 to 2012. The sample contains only mayors which have at least three running parties
within the coalition. Vertical axis: the values of each variable. The variables used are: 1. Total
Expenditure is the total amount of expenditure of the municipality. 2 Current Expenditure
is the portion of expenditure of the municipality that is used to fund ordinary management
of services. 3. Capital Expenditure is the portion of expenditure of the municipality which it
is intended to finance public works and real estates that produce repeated benefits over time.
4. Total Revenues is the total amount of revenues of the municipality. 5. Local Taxes is the
portion of revenues that comes from municipal taxes. 6. Fees & Tariffs include revenues from the
supply of public services, from exercising certain functions and from the management of certain
activities or from ownership of properties. 7. New Debt revenues from taking out loans serving
to finance investments. 8. Central Transfers revenues that come from higher administrative
level, mainly from the State, the Province and the Region. 9. Deficit is the differenze between
Total Expenditure and Total Revenues. Horizontal axis: it is the normalized distance from the
from the 50 percent threshold. In detail, is the percentage of the votes obtained by the mayor
minus 50. On the right of the threshold there are the mayors that have win at the first round.
On the left of the threshold there are the mayors that have win at the second round. The central
line is a linear fit. Scatter points are averaged over intervals of 0.25 percentage point.
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